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I empirically examine the choice of a firm’s vertical boundaries—specifically, the decision to use supplier-customer 
contracts instead of either using markets or vertical integration.  I examine the determinants of supplier-customer 
contracts using data on a customer’s contractual purchase obligations with its suppliers.  Contracting propensity is 
positively related to supplier relationship-specific investments (RSI), the supplier’s relative bargaining power, and 
vertical integration costs, and negatively related to contracting costs, alternative sources of information about the 
customer, and the percentage of a customer’s input traded on financial markets.  I also find that customer firms 
which have product market contracts with their suppliers have better relative performance.  These performance 
effects are enhanced by relationship-specific investments and are robust to corrections for endogeneity.  
Additionally, I examine the choice between vertical integration versus supplier-customer contracts and find that the 
choice is predicted by the type of RSI.  Consistent with theory, RSI measured using tangible (intangible) assets are 
positively related to integration (contracts).  Further, positive (negative) shocks to industry-level intangible 
investment are related to increases in a firm’s contracting activity and decreases (increases) in the level of vertical 
integration, while positive (negative) shocks to industry-level tangible investment are related to decreases in 
contracting activity and increases (decreases) in the level of vertical integration.  My results suggest that market 
frictions play an important role in shaping supplier-customer contracting activity and firm boundaries.   
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Vertical firm boundaries: supplier-customer contracts and vertical integration 
Transaction cost economics and the boundaries of the firm have gained considerable 
attention in the financial economics literature in recent years.
1
  Although the extant literature 
pays much attention to the question of why firms shape their boundaries through corporate 
restructuring activities like corporate takeovers and divestitures, the more basic question of when 
do firms enter into explicit contracts with their suppliers instead of either using markets or 
vertical integration to exchange goods and services has received scant attention.
2
   I provide a 
comprehensive examination of this question by building a database containing information on a 
specific type of supplier-customer contract, namely, a customer’s purchase obligations to 
suppliers.
3
  I then develop testable hypotheses and empirically examine the determinants of a 
firm’s explicit contracts with suppliers.  Contingent on entering these contracts, I then examine 
the determinants of the length of these supplier-customer contracts.  In addition, I investigate the 
impact of these contracts on firm performance.  Finally, I explore the firm's equilibrium choice 
between contracts and vertical integration, as well as firm-level changes in integration and 
contracting behavior in response to industry-level shocks to relationship-specific investments 
(RSI).   
Theory suggests that supplier incentives influence the propensity to contract.  
Specifically, hold-up problems created by a supplier’s relationship-specific and site-specific 
investments create incentives for a supplier to require customer firms to enter into contractual 
                                                          
1
 See, e.g., Allen and Phillips (2000), Zingales (2000), Chipty (2001), Burch and Nanda (2003), Fee, Hadlock, and 
Thomas (2006), Kale and Shahrur (2007), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009), Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011), 
and Kedia, Ravid, and Pons (2011), among others. 
2
 For example, Masten (1984), Joskow (1987), Crocker and Masten (1988), Hubbard and Weiner (1991), Allen and 
Lueck (1993), and Crocker and Reynolds (1993) explore firm organization in industry-specific industrial 
organization studies.  Chiappori and Salanie (2003) note that many empirical predications in this area remains 
untested.  
3
 Purchase obligations arise when a customer commits to purchase some quantity of a supplier’s output at a 
contractual price for a set number of years.  
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purchase obligations (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985).  The supplier’s bargaining power 
also positively impacts its ability to require its customers to enter into these contracts (Tirole, 
1988).  Additionally, from both the perspective of the supplier and customer, contracting costs 
and vertical integration costs are also important factors to consider when solving hold-up 
problems (Coase, 1937; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton, 2009).  If contracting costs are high, 
both suppliers and customers are less likely to engage in explicit contracts, whereas if vertical 
integration costs are high, suppliers and customers are more likely to use supplier contracts as a 
solution to transaction costs.   Further, stock prices can contain private information about a firm’s 
product market position (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007).  Suppliers and customers may 
obtain information about the customer’s product market position either from contracts or from 
alternative measures such as stock price informativeness.
4
  As stock price informativeness about 
a customer increases, the need for suppliers and customers to enter into costly contracts as a 
source of information decreases.  Additionally, the extant literature suggests that the cost of 
information acquisition increases in distance (Petersen, 2004; Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, and Ryan, 
2012).  If contracts serve as an alternative source of information, a supplier's distance from its 
customers is also likely to positively affect contracting behavior.
5
  Finally, the structure of 
purchase obligation contracts is similar to that of forward contracts.  If customers are trying to 
use fixed-price contracts to hedge, they are less likely to enter into supplier contracts if they can 
use financial markets, such as futures markets, to hedge more efficiently.   
                                                          
4
 In theory, a common way for suppliers to obtain information through contracts is to offer a menu of contracts to the 
customer (e.g., Tirole, 1988).  The supplier can generate information by observing the customer's choice of contract. 
5
 The information hypothesis and hold-up problems associated with site-specific investment generate conflicting 
predictions on how proximity should affect contracting activity.  If the information effect dominates, one expects a 
positive relation between distance and contracting.  If the previously mentioned hold-up problems associated with 
site-specific investments dominate, one expects a negative relation.   
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I test the above hypotheses using data on a firm’s contractual purchase obligations with 
its suppliers.
6
  Using the Perl scripting language, I collect this data from 10-K filings covering all 
public companies over the fiscal years 2003 – 2008.  Consistent with the previous discussion, I 
find evidence that supplier relationship-specific investments, the supplier’s relative bargaining 
power, and vertical integration costs positively affect the propensity for suppliers and customers 
to contract.  I also find evidence that the propensity for suppliers and customers to contract is 
negatively related to contracting costs, the customer’s stock price informativeness, and the 
percentage of a customer’s input traded on financial markets.  In addition, the proxy variable for 
proximity between suppliers and customers is negatively related to the propensity for suppliers 
and customers to contract.  Furthermore, in an examination of the determinants of contract 
length, I find that relationship-specific investments and relative bargaining power are positively 
related to contract length.  I also find that price informativeness and supplier-customer proximity 
decrease contract length.   
Further, in an examination of whether contracts have an effect on customer firm 
performance, I find that firms with purchase obligations to their suppliers have relatively higher 
operating return on assets (OROA) and firm value (Tobin’s Q).  These results are robust to 
corrections for endogeneity.  Thus, I find that contracting activity is positively related to 
performance.  I also examine counterfactual evidence in an effort to show a causal link between 
contracting and firm performance, by investigating the effect of contracts on performance when 
we should not observe contracts (and vice versa).  In these tests, I find that the positive relation 
between contracts and firm value occurs in environments where relationship-specific investment 
is high.  In subsamples where relationship-specific investment is low, the use of contracts 
                                                          
6
 Note that suppliers and customers have multiple types of contractual relationships.  Common supplier-customer 
contracts are procurement contracts, which often define input quality levels, etc.  However, purchase obligations 
create a requirement for the customer to purchase a minimum quantity at a contractual price.  
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negatively affects performance.  These subsample tests also help address a natural question 
asking why all firms do not use these contracts in equilibrium if they are performance 
enhancing—they are not optimal for firms in low-RSI environments.   
Finally, I study the choice between explicit contracts and vertical integration as 
alternative solutions to different types of market frictions.  In addition to probit estimates on the 
subsample of firms which are either integrated or use supplier contracts, I also use a two-stage 
process to examine this decision.  In a first-stage probit estimation, I use proxies for transaction 
costs described earlier to model the choice between vertical integration/use of supplier-customer 
contracts versus transacting in markets.  Next, in the second-stage probit estimation, I draw from 
the transaction costs and property rights literatures to identify the determinants of the choice 
between vertical integration and supplier contracts.   
Economic theory (e.g., Williamson, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1990), demonstrates that one cost of vertical integration is underinvestment in specific human 
capital by employees.  This is driven by workers in the newly integrated firm who must now 
share any surplus from specific human capital. As a result, this type of integration cost is likely 
to be relatively higher in human capital intensive industries than in physical capital intensive 
industries.  In empirical tests, I do find that the asset tangibility of the customer industry is 
negatively related to the propensity to contract and positively related to the propensity to 
vertically integrate.  Conversely, I find that the R&D intensities of the supplier industry and the 
customer firm are positively related to the propensity to contract and negatively related to the 
probability of vertical integration.  Additionally, I examine changes in industry-level R&D 
intensity, and find that positive (negative) shocks to industry-level R&D are associated with 
increases in the dollar amount of contracting intensity and decreases (increases) in a firm's level 
11 
 
of vertical relatedness.  Conversely, positive (negative) shocks to industry-level CAPEX are 
associated with decreases in the dollar amount of contracting intensity and increases (decreases) 
in a firm's level of vertical relatedness.  It, therefore, appears that the type of relationship-specific 
investment affects the structure of firm boundaries, both in equilibrium and in a firm’s response 
to industry shocks.  These results are also consistent with the empirical findings in Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Mitton (2009), who find that capital intensity positively affects the propensity to 
integrate, and Seru (2011), who demonstrates that conglomerate firms shift R&D activity outside 
of the firm by utilizing joint ventures and strategic alliances.  Contrary to Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Mitton (2009), however, my proxy for contracting costs does not significantly predict the 
choice between integration and contracting.
7
  I also find that contracting is more likely than 
vertical integration when supplier industry concentration is high, perhaps because integration in 
concentrated industries is likely to invite regulatory scrutiny.    
My study makes the following contributions.  First, it is the first study in financial 
economics that empirically examines the vertical boundaries of the firm using data on explicit 
supplier-customer contracts.
8
  I show that transaction costs and other market frictions are 
important determinants of a firm’s propensity to contract with its supplier.  My study builds on 
the previous literature which has examined other solutions to transaction costs such as vertical 
integration (Chipty, 2001; Fan and Goyal, 2006; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton, 2009; Shenoy, 
2012) and partial equity stakes, strategic alliances, and joint ventures (Allen and Phillips, 2000; 
Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas, 2006).  My results are also consistent with the notion that stock 
prices appear to contain product market-related information and, as such, support the conjecture 
                                                          
7
 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009) do find evidence that contracting costs affect vertical integration.  
However, their study utilizes international data and they have an inter-country proxy for contracting costs.  Given 
that I have U.S. data, I use an inter-state proxy.  Thus, the two sets of results may not be directly comparable. 
8
 A contemporaneous paper by Moon (2012) uses similar data to examine corporate outsourcing behavior. 
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by Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) that the information derived from stock prices is likely to 
be about the demand for the firm’s products or about its strategic landscape.   
  Second, this is first broad empirical study which shows that hold-up problems 
associated with different types of relationship-specific investments appear to have different 
optimal solutions.  High capital intensive firms are more likely to integrate than to contract, and 
high human capital intensive firms are more likely to contract than to integrate.  These results are 
consistent with the previously mentioned theoretical predictions in Williamson (1985), 
Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990), and empirical evidence on vertical 
integration in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009) and Seru (2011).  This evidence is also 
consistent with studies showing that asset ownership appears to be efficiently allocated among 
product market participants (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001, 2002; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010; 
Jain, Kini, and Shenoy, 2011; Seru, 2011).   
Further, I build on the industrial organizational literature by constructing a 
comprehensive panel database including all U.S. public companies.  Johnson and Houston 
(2000) examine the choice between contracts and joint ventures using a sample of 208 firms.  
Most other empirical papers (Allen and Lueck, 1993; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Crocker and 
Masten, 1988; Hubbard and Weiner, 1991) are similar in flavor in that they are constrained by 
small sample sizes.  For example, previous research has studied specific types of contracts in 
very narrowly defined industries, such as Air Force engine procurement (Crocker and Reynolds, 
1993) and crop share contracts (Allen and Lueck, 1993).  In a seminal empirical paper, Joskow 
(1987) uses a sample of 277 coal contracts with utility companies to test theories related to 
supply-chain contracting.  He finds that site specificity and product heterogeneity affect the 
existence of coal contracts as well as contract length.  Typically, the above studies examine a 
13 
 
single year and a single industry due to issues with data availability; this current study 
overcomes that limitation.  My data contains all U.S. public companies and the form of the 
contract I study (purchase obligations) is similar to the ex ante contracts described in theory.   
Finally, I add to the recent literature examining how product markets affect hedging 
activity (Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman, 2007; Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell, 2007), and the 
literature discussing alternative corporate hedging behavior (e.g. Petersen and Thiagarajan, 2000; 
Guay and Kothari, 2003; Hankins, 2011) by noting that customers with large percentages of their 
input traded on futures markets are less likely to have purchase obligations with their suppliers. 
I proceed as follows:  In Section 1, I outline existing theoretical predictions and generate 
testable hypotheses.  In Section 2, I describe the construction of my dataset and the variables 
used in the study.  Section 3 contains univariate and multivariate tests exploring the determinants 
of supplier contracts. In Section 4, I describe robustness checks and additional tests, and in 
Section 5 I examine the relation between contracts and firm performance.  In Section 6, I 
examine the choice between vertical integration and the use of supplier contracts. Section 7 
concludes the paper.  
1. Hypotheses Development 
In this section, I draw on extant theory to develop predictions for the determinants of 
vertical contracting based on the extant theoretical literature in financial economics and 
industrial organization.  Much of this literature suggests that the forces influencing the existence 
of product market contracts also impact the length of the contractual relationship. As such, I do 
not generate separate hypotheses for the economic forces that impact the length of these 
contracts.   
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1.1. Relationship-specific investments 
Numerous theories (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Alchian, 1984; Tirole, 1988) predict that supplier-customer 
relationships requiring relationship-specific investments can generate hold-up problems.  
Consider a situation where relationship-specific investments are to be made by the supplier in 
order to produce an input for a customer, and there is no long-term contract or vertical 
integration with the supplier.  The supplier makes the investment, manufactures the product or 
provides the service, and the supplier and customer subsequently bargain over the surplus 
created.  Because relationship-specific investments are time inconsistent, they create incentives 
for customers to behave opportunistically.  Specifically, the customer can ex post refuse to 
purchase the input from the supplier (or offer him an “unfair” price) after the supplier has already 
made the investment anticipating future sales.  The rational supplier anticipates this and never 
makes the investment to begin with, causing ex ante underinvestment.  Without long-term 
contracts or integration, the equilibrium results in underinvestment. 
A solution to the underinvestment problem is ex ante contracting.  The customer commits 
to purchase a minimum quantity at a certain price from the supplier before the supplier makes the 
investment.  These contracts limit opportunistic behavior by the customer and induce the supplier 
to make the necessary investment.  Thus, supplier-customer contracts should be more likely in 
environments where relationship-specific investments are required to be made by suppliers.  
H1:  If relationship-specific investments are to be made by suppliers, they will require their 
customers to enter into purchase obligations.  
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1.2. Bargaining power 
Williamson (1985) and Tirole (1988) predict that the contractual relationship between a 
supplier and customer is affected by bargaining power.  Specifically, the ability for a customer to 
easily switch suppliers (or vice versa) will affect the relative bargaining power in the 
relationship.  If a customer industry is monopolistic and a supplier industry is competitive, the 
customer’s bargaining power generally eliminates the existence of contractual purchase 
obligations.
9
  A competitive supplier industry has little to no bargaining power over the 
monopolistic customer and will be unable to pressure the customer into accepting the obligation.  
Conversely, if a monopolistic supplier is selling to customers operating in a competitive industry, 
purchase obligations will be more likely.  The supplier’s superior bargaining power allows them 
to pressure customers to ex ante commit to some level of purchases.  Additionally, a 
monopolistic supplier’s output is unlikely to have a perfect substitute.  Thus, supplier and 
customer bargaining power affect the propensity for a firm to enter into purchase obligations to 
suppliers. 
H2:  Supplier (customer) bargaining power is positively (negatively) related to a firm’s 
propensity to enter into contractual purchase obligations with suppliers.  Thus, the supplier’s 
bargaining power relative to the customer’s bargaining power will be positively related to the 
firm’s propensity to enter into contractual purchase obligations with suppliers. 
1.3. Contracting costs 
Contracting costs likely affect a firm’s decision to explicitly contract.  If contracting costs 
are high, a firm should explore alternative methods for alleviating transaction costs, such as 
implicit contracts (Zingales, 2000; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 2002; Kale, Meneghetti, and 
                                                          
9
 The customer will not need to create a liability by obligating itself to purchase from any particular supplier.  If they 
are the sole downstream customer for a supplier industry, the supplier industry will already sell at its marginal cost. 
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Shahrur, 2012) or vertical mergers (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, 2009).  Thus, explicit supplier-customer contracts should occur 
less frequently when contracting costs are high.   
H3:  Explicit contracting costs are negatively related to a firm’s propensity to enter into 
contractual purchase obligations with suppliers.  
1.4. Public and private information 
Suppliers can infer information about customers using contracts (Bajari and Tadelis, 
2001).  A common theoretical mechanism (Tirole, 1988) is to offer a menu of contracts to a 
customer, and infer information from the customer’s choice.  Stock prices are also thought to 
contain private information about a firm’s product market position (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 
2007).  Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) calculate stock price informativeness as the 
component of stock returns not correlated with industry or market returns.  Their measure is 
particularly valid because they mention that the information contained in stock prices is likely to 
be information about “the demand for the firm’s products or other strategic issues, such as 
competition with other firms.”  This information is especially valuable to firms with product 
market relationships with the reference firm.  If a firm’s stock price is highly correlated with the 
industry and market, it is less likely to represent firm specific information (stock price 
informativeness is low).  If stock price informativeness is high, it is a useful source of alternative 
information to parties outside the firm, especially regarding product market information, there is 
less need for suppliers to use costly contracts as an information-gathering mechanism.  
H4:  The customer’s stock price informativeness is negatively related to a firm’s propensity to 
enter into contractual purchase obligations with suppliers.   
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1.5. Supplier-customer proximity 
Petersen (2004) discusses differences between hard and soft information.  Intuitively, 
hard information is quantitative and easily transferable across unrelated parties, but soft 
information represents more intangible data that can be gathered through relationships and/or 
face-to-face interaction.  Petersen suggests that soft information is decreasing in distance.  Thus, 
other forms of information, such as contracting, should serve as substitutes for soft information 
as distance increases.  Thus, if contracts represent information, one hypothesis predicts a 
negative relation between supplier-customer proximity and contracting intensity.  Alternatively, 
Williamson (1985) and Tirole (1988) both mention site specificity as a special kind of 
relationship-specific investment. An investment is site specific if the supplier is required to 
invest in a specific location for a customer, i.e., the supplier needs to build a factory next to the 
customer’s factory.  In the absence of long-term contracting or integration, site specific 
investments present the same time-inconsistency problem as other relationship-specific 
investments discussed above.  Once the supplier makes the site specific investment, the customer 
can engage in opportunistic behavior ex post.  The rational supplier will anticipate this behavior 
and will not make the investment ex ante.  One solution to this problem is a long-term contract 
which commits the customer to purchasing the supplier’s output once the investment is made.  
Thus, theory predicts conflicting hypotheses. 
H5:  Supplier-customer proximity is negatively related to a firm’s propensity to engage in 
contractual purchase obligations with its suppliers.  
H5A:  Supplier’s site specificity is positively related to a firm’s propensity to engage in 
contractual purchase obligations with its suppliers.  
 
18 
 
2.  Data and Sample Description 
 In the following section, I describe the dataset used in this paper.  I utilize 10-K filings 
for some variables; 10-K filings are available electronically from 1996.  However, the main 
variable of interest, a firm’s purchase obligations to suppliers, has only been reported in 10-K 
filings from fiscal year 2003 onward.  Thus, the sample consists of all Compustat firm-years 
from 2003 – 2008 with an available 10-K filing on the SEC’s EDGAR site.  After excluding 
financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), the six-year panel dataset consists of 19,749 
firm-years.  In the following subsections, I detail the construction of variables used in this paper. 
2.1. Purchase agreements with suppliers 
 Firms are required to disclose purchase obligations to suppliers in a footnote discussing 
contractual obligations.
10
  The purchase agreements, in general, contractually obligate the 
customer to purchase a fixed or minimum quantity at a fixed, minimum, or variable price from a 
supplier.  Since 12/15/2003, firms with commitments to their suppliers break the disclosure out 
in a table contained in this footnote, usually labeled as a separate line item titled “Purchase 
obligations”.  An example of a footnote is in Appendix A.  This line item also usually includes the 
dollar amount of supplier purchase obligations for the subsequent five years.  Using the 
programming language Perl, I automatically search the contractual obligations footnote in all 
fiscal year 2003 – 2008 10-K filings for the “Purchase obligation” line item, and create an 
indicator variable, Supplier Contract, which equals one for all firms which report purchase 
obligations, and “0” otherwise.  Further, I also use Perl to automatically extract the aggregate 
dollar amounts of the purchase obligations for the next five years from this footnote.  If a firm 
uses the text “purchase obligation” in its footnote, but reports $0 for the aggregate dollar 
                                                          
10
 Unfortunately, the opposite is not true.  If a firm enters into a downstream contract, an obligation to supply a 
product to a customer, it is not required to disclose the liability.  Thus, I am only able to examine one direction in the 
supply chain. 
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amounts of the contracts, I code Supplier Contract equal to zero.  This stringent definition of 
purchase obligations eliminates false positives.
11
  However, it also removes firms which report 
purchase obligations, but in a way such that the automated data collection technique could not 
obtain dollar values.  Using the stringent definition, roughly 20.3% of all Compustat firm-year 
observations are for firms which have entered into purchase contracts with their suppliers.  I also 
construct a version of Supplier Contract using a less stringent definition, which is equal to one if 
a firm mentions purchase obligations somewhere in the footnote, but potentially reports a zero 
balance or does not report a balance.  This approach eliminates false negatives.  Using this 
definition of Supplier Contract, roughly 28.0% of all Compustat firm-years are for firms which 
have entered into purchase contracts with suppliers.  While the stringent definition is used in all 
reported empirical tests, the results are robust to instead using the less stringent definition. 
The raw data containing the dollar values of the aggregate purchase obligations have 
several potential problems.  One problem is that in addition to columns for years t+1 to t+6, the 
footnote line item also includes a “Total” column; sometimes this occurs before year t+1 and 
sometimes after t+6.  I am able to automatically remove the “Total” column through 
programming.  A related problem exists for the data I collect on contract length.  Although many 
firms report the dollar amount of purchase obligations for years t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4, t+5, t+6 and 
onward, some firms group years t+2 and t+3 together, years t+4 and t+5 together, etc.  For these 
firms, the estimate for contract length will be systematically too short.  The example footnote 
from Coca-Cola’s 10-K in Appendix B demonstrates one such situation.  I am unable to solve 
this problem programmatically, although firms are unlikely to systematically differ in reporting 
                                                          
11
 Firms occasionally use the term “purchase obligations” in their 10-K filings when they do not have them.  For 
example, Aflac’s 10-K contains a statement mentioning that Aflac “does not have any purchase obligations or other 
related agreements with suppliers”.  Additionally, firms sometimes list the line item “Purchase obligation” and have 
zero balances for the aggregate amount contracted.   
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based on the transaction cost-type variables examined here.  The third problem is that firms use 
different scales (millions, thousands, etc) when reporting footnote tables depending on firm size.  
I use a combination of automated and manual techniques to identify the scale a firm is using.  
First, I automatically search the contractual obligations footnote for common text used to report 
scale (e.g., “in millions”, “in 000s”, etc).  Second, I manually examine the time-series of the 
amount of each firm’s supplier purchase obligations and compare the scale in consecutive years 
to ensure consistency.  Lastly, I manually examine firms which have annual purchase obligations 
that are higher than current year cost of goods sold to ensure that the scale is correct.   The 
resulting unique database identifies the existence of a firm’s contractual purchase obligations to 
its suppliers as well as estimates of the lengths and amounts of these obligations.  I next outline 
the construction of the main independent variables. 
2.2.Key variable construction 
The footnote disclosure describing purchase obligations describes the aggregate liability.  
Thus, the individual suppliers for each firm are not identified in the footnote.  As a result, for 
variables related to supplier characteristics, I employ weighted average supplier industry 
characteristics.  I construct proxy variables at the supplier-industry level for a host of transaction 
costs by using weighted-average supplier industry characteristics, where the weight is the 
percentage of input supplied from each supplier industry for a particular firm.  I merge 
Compustat financial data with the 2002 Input-Output tables (IO Tables) from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) to aggregate supplier industry characteristics for each firm and 
construct the proxy variables.
12
   
                                                          
12
 Although previously utilizing both SIC and NAICS codes, the BEA has switched exclusively to NAICS codes.  
As a result, NAICS codes are used throughout this paper. 
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Following Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006), Kale and Shahrur (2007), among others, I 
use supplier R&D intensity to proxy for relationship-specific investments (RSI) made by a firm’s 
suppliers.
13
  Armour and Teece (1980) argue that vertical supply chains with high R&D intensity 
tend to have complex inter-stage interdependencies, representing an environment where 
relationship-specific investments are likely to be higher.  As I do not have the identity of the 
original suppliers, I create a weighted-average of all supplier industry R&D.     
I first replace missing R&D values with zero and then aggregate firm-year R&D by two-
digit NAICS code to construct industry characteristics.  I define Industry R&D as aggregate 
industry R&D divided by aggregate industry assets.
14
  Next, I link the industry-year R&D to 
each six-digit IO industry from the 2002 Input-Output tables from the BEA.  For each customer 
industry, I use the “Use” table from the Input-Output tables and weight each six-digit supply 
industry characteristic by the percentage of input they supply to the customer industry.  For 
example: if “Energy” has an R&D Intensity of 10% and it supplies 50% of a customer industry’s 
input, and “Retail” has an R&D Intensity of 0% and it supplies the other 50% of a customer 
industry’s input, the weighted average supplier R&D for that customer would be 5%.  
Mathematically, I construct Supplier R&D Intensity for each firm in industry j as follows: 
                                                                     
 
   
   
 
 (1) 
where j is the firm’s primary six-digit IO industry, and i is the six-digit IO industry for each 
supplier industry, n is the number of industries which sell inputs to the reference firm, Industry 
                                                          
13
 Additional papers which use R&D to proxy for relationship-specific investments are Raman and Shahrur (2008), 
Holmstrom and Roberts (1998), and Milgrom and Roberts (1992).  
14
 Note that, since R&D is a skewed variable in Compustat, this definition (total industry R&D scaled by total 
industry assets) reduces the impact of smaller firms with extremely high R&D intensities. 
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R&D is the R&D/Assets of the industry and the Industry Input Coefficient is the percentage of 
industry j’s input which comes from industry i.15   
 I use two additional variables to proxy for RSI.  The first is a measure of supplier output 
heterogeneity based on Rauch (1999).  Specifically, I start by using the two-digit Giannetti, 
Burkhart, and Ellingson (2011) definitions (based on Rauch, 1999) to identify each supplier 
industry’s output as differentiated or non-differentiated.  I construct a dummy variable, 
Differentiated Goods, which is equal to one if the industry’s output is differentiated, and zero 
otherwise.  I then construct Supplier Differentiated Goods in the same manner as Supplier R&D 
Intensity above.  This variable measures the percentage of each customer firm’s input which is 
differentiated.
16
     
 The last proxy for RSI is patent cross-citation intensity between the supplier and 
customer industry.  Kale, Kedia, and Williams (2012) argue that patent cross-citation between 
suppliers and customers indicates research specific to the suppliers and customers.  I use the 
NBER patent data maintained by Bronwyn Hall (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001) and identify 
supplier industries and customer industries with patent cross citation in a particular year.  I code 
cross citation equal to one if either the supplier industry cites the customer industry in a patent or 
the customer industry cites the supplier industry in a patent for a given year.  Cross citation is 
equal to zero if neither the supplier industry nor customer industry cites each other in a patent for 
a given year.  I then create Patent Cross-Citation Intensity, which is the supplier weighted 
average value of all supplier-customer industry relationships from the IO tables, similar to 
                                                          
15
 Kale and Shahrur (2007) use a similar procedure. Following them, I also exclude intra-industry sales in the above 
calculations.  This ensures that the captured supplier weights are for actual upstream firms. 
16
 In unreported results, I include an indicator variable which is equal to one if the customer firm’s own industry 
output is differentiated, zero otherwise.  This does not significantly affect the propensity for a firm to contract with 
its suppliers.  However, there are likely downstream effects (on the customer’s customers) which cannot be observed 
in my data. 
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equation 1.  Note that NBER patent data is only currently available through 2006, so the sample 
period using this proxy shrinks to 2003—2006. 
 I construct a proxy for bargaining power by calculating supplier and customer industry 
concentrations.  I first measure each two-digit NAICS industry Herfindahl Index, which is the 
sum of squared market shares of all firms in each two-digit industry-year.
17 
 After calculating 
Herfindahl Index for each industry, I then use the same weighting methodology reported above 
to generate the weighted-average Supplier Herfindahl Index.  Given that the contract is the 
outcome of a bargaining game, it is possible that relative bargaining power (and relative HHI) 
between the suppliers and customers is important, rather than the supplier/customer industry HHI 
in isolation.  I create a measure of relative bargaining power, Relative Herf Index, which is the 
ratio of Supplier Herfindahl Index to the customer firm’s own industry Herfindahl Index.18 
 The proxy for contracting costs is created by examining the legal environment for 
contracting in each state.  For each year, I take the annual US Chamber of Commerce State 
Liability Systems Ranking Survey and use the “State Rankings for Overall Treatment of Tort and 
Contract Litigation”.  The highest-ranked state in a given year is assigned a value of “50” and 
the lowest-ranked state a value of “1”.  I assign a contracting environment to each firm-year 
based on the location of the customer’s headquarters.  This variable is Contracting Legal Rank, 
and the variable used in the multivariate tests is its natural logarithm, or ln[Contracting Legal 
                                                          
17
 Note that I use a scale of 0-1 for Herfindahl Indexes rather than 1-10,000. 
18
 This intuition is similar to the Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) study examining the relative reputation of financial 
advisors in corporate takeovers. 
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Rank].
19
  Variation in contract enforcement is well-grounded in the economics literature as a 
transaction cost (e.g., Williamson, 2002).
20
 
I construct a proxy for alternative public information about a firm by using stock price 
informativeness (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; Roll, 1988).  I calculate firm-year stock 
Price Informativeness by regressing daily stock returns for each fiscal year onto daily returns for 
the value-weighted S&P 500 index and the value-weighted daily returns of the firm’s own two-
digit industry.  The firm’s annual stock price informative is (1-r2) for each firm-year regression.   
I use data contained in the IO tables to proxy for distance.  Transportation Costs are 
obtained from the IO tables, which they estimate using the difference in supplier price and 
customer cost.  I divide Transportation Costs by the total amount of customer cost, and then take 
a weighted average to obtain an average Supplier Transportation Cost.  Proximity is defined as 
the additive inverse (0 – Supplier Transportation Costs).  To the extent that transportation costs 
are likely to increase with distance, this variable is a proxy variable for the distance between 
supplier industries and customer industries. 
2.3.Contracting Environment 
Firms face additional exogenous factors which influencing their contracting 
environments.  I control for two in all multivariate tests.  One possible factor is alternative 
sources of contracts.  Conditional on a firm’s decision to contract, they may be less likely to use 
product market contracts if more efficient alternatives are available in financial markets.  To 
control for this possibility, I construct % of Input Traded, which captures the percentage of a 
                                                          
19
 A recent paper with similar intuition is Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009), which examines the relation between a 
state’s level of corruption and municipal bond yields.  Among other results, they find that higher state corruption is 
associated with higher bond yields.   
20
 Williamson (2002) states "Whereas economic orthodoxy often implicitly assumes that there is a single, all-
purpose law of contract that is costlessly enforced by well-informed courts, the private ordering approach (in 
transaction cost economics) to governance postulates instead that each generic mode of governance is defined (in 
part) by a distinctive contract law regime." 
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firm’s input which is traded on financial markets.  I use the same methodology as that in 
Williams’ (2012) study on corporate hedging by defining input industries as "traded" or "non-
traded" on futures markets, and then generating a weighted-average supplier industry 
characteristic similar to supplier variables defined earlier. 
Additionally, I control for vertical integration costs.  If integration costs are low and 
contracting costs are high, firms will likely choose to solve high transaction costs with 
integration rather than contracts.  One potential cost to integration is underinvestment in human 
capital by employees discussed in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).  Hold-
up problems associated with R&D may be difficult to solve using integration for this reason.  
Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) argue that capital intensity may be an example of RSI 
specifically solved by integration (i.e., firms with high capital intensity may have hold-up 
problems, but this type of investment is typically not subject to the human capital-type problems 
in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)).  Based on this literature, I use two 
digit industry-year median tangibility ratio, or Industry-Median Tangibility (Net PPE/Total 
Assets) to proxy for the propensity to integrate in the industry, or the opposite of industry 
integration costs.
21
   
2.4.Control Variables 
I control for a variety of firm characteristics in the multivariate tests.  % Imports are the 
supplier industry-weighted average of the “Noncomparable imports” category from the IO tables 
to control for any foreign imports which the BEA cannot map to the IO tables.  R&D Intensity is 
                                                          
21
 The results are robust to using PPE/Total Sales (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton, 2009).  Note that here the 
customer industry tangibility is used.  This is done to stay consistent with the structure of the contracting data.  
Recall that the supplier uses contracts to protect themselves from a hold-up problem.  An alternative solution is for 
the supplier to vertically integrate with the customer; thus, the customer’s tangibility is likely to be an important 
factor for the supplier.  Nonetheless, the results and interpretation are robust to instead using (or including) supplier 
tangibility. 
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defined as a firm’s R&D expense divided by total assets (Compustat variables XRD/AT).  Firms 
which have not reported R&D expenses are assigned a R&D Intensity value of zero.  As leverage 
and RSI have been shown to influence each other (Titman, 1984), I also control for Book 
Leverage, defined as total debt divided by total assets (Compustat variables (DLC + DLTT)/AT).  
I use Sales Growth, defined as [(Salest/ Salest-1) – 1] using Compustat data item REVT for sales, 
to control for possible demand-side pressures faced by the customer.  Finally, I control for firm 
size using Ln[Assets], defined as the natural logarithm of total book assets (Compustat data item 
AT).   
2.5.Summary Statistics 
Table 1 displays summary statistics for the dataset.  Supplier Contracts is a dummy 
variable equal to “1” if the firm lists purchase obligations in its 10-K and “0” otherwise.  As 
noted earlier, roughly 20.3% of all firm-year observations report purchase obligations to 
suppliers in their 10-K filings.  The average (median) firm using contracts reports an aggregate 
contract length of 2.49 years (3 years).  I also report the dollar amounts under contract for each 
future year i scaled by current year cost of goods sold (Contractual Dollar Amountt+i/COGSt).
22
  
The average firm using contracts commits to purchase 12% of its COGS in year t+1, 7% in year 
t+2, 5% in year t+3, and less than 1% in future years.  For the median firm, the dollar amount 
contracted for becomes negligible after year t+1.   
Table 1 also presents summary statistics on supplier industry characteristics.  The 
weighted average of Supplier Herfindahl Index is, on average, about 0.04, and the weighted 
average Supplier R&D Intensity is 2% of total assets.  The average firm in the sample purchases 
27% of its input from Supplier Differentiated Goods industries.  The weighted average of 
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 I am not able to calculate this variable for firms which do not report COGS.  As a result, I lose 44 observations 
when creating this variable. 
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supplier-customer industry Patent Cross-Citation Intensity is equal to 0.03, with the median 
supplier-customer industry pairing having no cross-citation.  The average firm has 3% of its 
input traded on a financial market.  Average Proximity is -0.07, indicating that transportation 
costs are on average 7% of the customer industry’s total input cost.  The firm’s own industry 
Industry-Median Tangibility ratio is equal to 0.21, the average Herfindahl index for the firm’s 
own industry is 0.04, and the average firm's industry had 0.01% of its inputs defined as non-
comparable imports according to the IO tables.  On average, a firm is headquartered in a state 
with a legal rank of 20.27 (with the best being a rank of 50).  It also appears that a handful of 
variables (namely R&D Intensity and Book Leverage) are affected by negative equity; this allows 
variables scaled by book assets to appear abnormally large.  This effect is also apparent from the 
small value of the minimum Assets.  Although all data are winsorized at 1% and 99%, I re-run all 
tests after winsorizing at 2% and 98% and also re-run all tests after manually changing negative 
equity to zero.  The results in the paper are unaffected by these alternative approaches to 
handling the outliers of a handful of control variables.   
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 2 contains correlation coefficients between the various variables of interest.  Note 
that the three proxy variables for RSI are reasonably highly correlated with each other.  For 
example, the correlation between Supplier R&D Intensity and Supplier Differentiated Goods is 
0.68, and the correlation between Supplier Differentiated Goods and Patent Cross-Citation 
Intensity is 0.26.  Table 3 displays supplier contract status by Fama-French industry definitions.  
The data indicates industry variation in the propensity to enter into supplier contracts even when 
using a broad industry definition. 
[Insert Table 2] 
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 [Insert Table 3] 
“Shipping Containers” is the industry with the highest proportion of contracts with its 
suppliers.  To illustrate, Owens-Illinois is one of the largest firms in this industry.  It produces 
specialized glass and plastic containers used by soft drink companies, etc.  To create these 
specialized glass containers, it purchases proprietary molds from suppliers (who must make 
relationship-specific investments to build the specialized molds).  Owens-Illinois enters into 
contracts with suppliers for these molds.  Additionally, Supplier R&D Intensity for the shipping 
containers industry is 2.7%, which is above the 95
th
 percentile in the sample.  Shipping 
containers is followed by Business Supplies, Shipbuilding & Railroad, Aircraft, and Precious 
Metals.
23
  The bottom five are Tobacco, Textiles, Mining, Retail, and Other.  Utilities and 
Energy also report a much lower propensity to enter into contacts.
24
  Using the “less stringent” 
definition of purchase obligations described earlier does not qualitatively change this ordering. 
3. Determinants of Supply Contracts 
In this section, I present evidence that transaction costs and other market frictions are 
significant determinants in forming supplier-customer contracts.  Before turning to a multivariate 
examination of the determinants of supplier contracts, I first present univariate tests examining 
differences in key independent variables between firms which have supplier purchase obligations 
and those that do not. 
 
 
                                                          
23
 One important point is that many of these industries also use purchase obligations during this sample period to 
hedge against steel price fluctuations.  During the 2003—2008 sample period, steel is not traded on financial 
markets as it was deemed too heterogeneous. 
24
 On first glance, this is surprising given the seminal empirical study using coal suppliers and customers in Joskow 
(1987).  However, upon manual examination, utility industries tend to have high levels of vertical integration, which 
is another way of mitigating transaction costs and is examined in detail below. 
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3.1.Univariate tests – potential selection bias 
In later empirical tests, e.g., estimating the determinants of contract length, I examine 
only the subsample of firms which utilize supplier contracts.  However, if supplier contracts are 
not randomly assigned throughout the sample, traditional multivariate estimates (i.e. OLS, 
Probit) may be subject to a selection bias.  In Table 4, I split the sample based on Supplier 
Contract status and examine whether the two samples differ across a host of various firm 
characteristics.  I find that the two samples significantly differ at the 1% level on book assets, 
Tobin’s Q, cash holdings, book leverage, sales growth, ROA, and R&D.  These univariate tests 
indicate that sample selection is likely a concern when performing multivariate analysis on a 
subsample of firms with supplier contracts.  I subsequently control for selection bias in empirical 
tests involving this subsample. 
[Insert Table 4] 
3.2. Univariate tests – transaction costs 
Table 5 contains univariate tests examining variation in a firm’s supplier contracting 
status across different key independent variables.   I examine univariate differences in Supplier 
R&D Intensity, Supplier Differentiated Goods, Patent Cross-Citation Intensity, Relative Herf 
Index, Contracting Legal Rank, Price Informativeness, and Proximity.  
Firms with higher Supplier R&D Intensity are more likely to have supply contracts.  The 
difference of 12 basis points is also significant at the 1% level.  Firms which have higher levels 
of Supplier Differentiated Goods are more likely to have long term contracts with their suppliers.  
Specifically, 28.2% of their input is differentiated, compared to 26.9% of differentiated input for 
firms which do not enter into purchase obligations with their suppliers.  The difference of 1.3% 
is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Firms with supplier purchase obligations have patent 
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cross citation intensity of 2.8% compared to 2.5% in firms without supplier purchase obligations.  
The difference is significant at the 5% level.  I examine differences in Relative Herf Index 
between the weighted-average supplier industries and the firm’s own two digit NAICS industry 
Herfindahl Index.  The Relative Herf Index is higher by 0.046 for firms using supplier purchase 
obligations and the difference is significant at the 1% level.  Price Informativeness is 69.2% for 
firms which enter into purchase agreements with suppliers and 76.5% for firms which do not, 
with the difference significant at 99%.  Additionally, firms with purchase obligations to suppliers 
have Proximity of -0.070 compared to a value of -0.064 for non-purchase obligation firms, with 
the difference significant at the 1% level.  Finally, Contracting Legal Environment has an 
average value of 20.809 for firms with supplier contracts and 20.135 for firms without supplier 
contracts.   
[Insert Table 5] 
All univariate results are consistent with the theoretical predictions.  Specifically, the 
presence of higher transaction costs results in a higher unconditional likelihood of product 
market contracts between supplier and customer.  Next, I examine the effect of transaction costs 
on product market contracts in a multivariate framework. 
3.3. Multivariate tests:  Firm-level 
Table 6 contains multivariate probit estimates.  All models predict the probability of a 
firm having supplier contracts using key variables representing market frictions, which were 
discussed earlier in the paper.  All models also use some form of the following specification, 
including the independent variable(s) of interest: 
Supplier Contracti,t = 0 + 1Supplier R&D Intensityi,t  + 2Patent Cross-citation Intensityi,t + 
3Supplier Differentiated Goodsi,t + 4Relative Herf Indexi,t + 5Ln[Contracting Legal Rank]i,t + 
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6Price Informativenessi,t + 7Proximityi,t + Control Variables + Year dummies + Constant + i,t.             
   (2) 
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm in all specifications, and year dummy variables are 
included.  I do not include industry dummy variables because many of the transaction costs 
variables are industry-level variables themselves and are thus identical across all firms within a 
particular industry-year.  Because I examine supplier/customer bargaining power both separately 
and in relative terms, Herfindahl Indexi,t and Supplier Herfindahl Indexi,t replace Relative Herf 
Index in some specifications. 
[Insert Table 6] 
Models 1-3 examine the effect of supplier RSI on the propensity of suppliers and 
customers to contract.  In Model 1, Supplier R&D Intensity has a coefficient of 14.80 and is 
significant at the 1% level.  In Model 2, Patent Cross-Citation Intensity has a coefficient of 0.54 
and is significant at the 1% level.  Supplier Differentiated Goods is the independent variable of 
interest in Model 3 and has a coefficient of 0.40 and is also significant at 1%.  These results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 1; in supply-chain relationships which require relationship-specific 
investments by the supplier, the supplier will require an ex ante contractual commitment by the 
customer to purchase the eventual output.  This is consistent with the general idea that purchase 
obligations/supply contracts arise to mitigate hold-up problems faced by the supplier.   
Models 4 and 5 examine the effect of relative bargaining power and private information 
on the propensity to contract.  In Model 4, I examine the effect of relative bargaining power on 
the propensity to contract. Relative Herf Index has a coefficient of 0.05 and is significant at 10%.  
In Model 5, I examine the impact of private information on the propensity to contract; Price 
Informativeness has a coefficient of -0.22 and is significant at 5%.  Thus, the supplier’s 
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bargaining power relative to the customer is positively related to the existence of contractual 
purchase obligations.  Additionally, the amount of information in stock prices is negatively 
related to the existence of contractual purchase obligations, consistent with Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 4.   
In Model 6, I examine the effect of proximity on the existence of supplier-customer 
contracts.  Proximity is statistically significant at the 1% level and carries a negative sign, 
implying that contracts are more likely when the supplier and customer are further apart.  As it 
does not appear that supplier and customer industries are more likely to contract when they are 
located near each other, I do not find support for the hypothesis that Proximity is capturing 
effects related to site-specific investment by suppliers and/or customers.   
In Model 7, I present results including variables for RSI, relative bargaining power, 
private information, and supplier-customer proximity.  Supplier R&D Intensity has a coefficient 
of 11.09 and is significant at 1%, Relative Herf Index has a coefficient of 0.05 and is significant 
at 10%, and Price Informativeness has a coefficient of -0.21 and significant at the 5% level.  
Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] is also positive and is significant at least 10% in all specifications 
except for Model 6.  This is consistent with Hypothesis 3, that lower contracting costs are 
positively related to more contracting.  If a customer firm is headquartered in a state recognized 
as having a better legal environment for contracts, they are more likely to enter into contracts. 
  Proximity has a coefficient of -0.83 and is significant at 10%.  Note that I control for 
alternative contracting possibilities and the propensity to vertically integrate in all specifications 
using % of Input Traded and Industry-Median Tangibility, respectively.  % of Input Traded is 
significant in all specifications and carries a negative coefficient.  If a large portion of a firm’s 
input is traded on financial markets, they are less likely to use product market contracts.  Finally, 
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Industry-Median Tangibility is negative and significant at 1% in all specifications.  As discussed 
by Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009), capital intensity appears to be a type of RSI with low 
vertical integration costs.  Thus, in industries with high capital intensity, integration costs are 
likely lower and a lower propensity to contract is observed.  Contracting is negatively related to 
book leverage.  This is likely due to the fact that contracting is positively related to RSI, and 
Kale and Shahrur (2007) demonstrate a negative relation between book leverage and RSI.   
I also examine the economic impact of each independent variable after holding all other 
variables at their means.  Using the final model in Table 6, I find that increasing Supplier R&D 
Intensity from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile increases the probability of observing 
contracting by 38%, from 0.16 to 0.22.  The economic impact of other variables are somewhat 
smaller; changing from the 25th to 75th percentile of Relative Herf Index and Price 
Informativeness are related to changes in contracting probability by 10% ( from 0.20 to 0.22),  
and by -9% (from 0.22 to 0.20), respectively.  Changing Proximity from its 25th to 75th 
percentile decreases the probability of observing contracting by 10% (from 0.21 to 0.19), and 
shifting from the 25th to the 75th percentile of Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] increases the 
contracting probability by 16%, from 0.19 to 0.22.   
3.4.Multivariate tests:  Industry-level 
Note again that all supplier industry variables are linked to customer industries using the 
IO tables.  Thus, there is no variation in supplier characteristics for customers who are grouped 
in the same industry-year.  As robustness to the firm-level tests, I re-test the previous hypotheses 
using industry-level data.  In order to do this, I aggregate all customer firm characteristics in each 
two-digit industry and construct industry-level variables.  Specifically, Industry Supplier 
Contracts is the percentage of firms in a given industry-year which are using supplier contracts, 
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and ln[Contracting Legal Rank], Book Leverage, R&D Intensity, ln[Assets], and are two digit 
industry-year averages.  Sales Growth represents the sales growth of the entire two-digit 
industry.  The sample size shrinks to 295 industry-year observations when examining industry-
level data. 
 [Insert Table 7] 
The results are generally consistent with those reported in Table 6.  Supplier R&D 
Intensity and Supplier Differentiated Goods are significantly positive at the 1% level, although 
Patent Cross-citation Intensity is not statistically significant.  Relative Herf Index is significant at 
the 10% level.  % of Input Traded and Industry-Median Tangibility remain significantly negative 
in most specifications, and ln[Contracting Legal Rank] remains significantly positive.  One 
variable of note, Proximity, remains negative although not significantly so. 
4. Robustness checks and additional tests 
This section describes a variety of additional robustness tests of the above results and 
some additional tests.     
4.1.Vertically integrated firms 
Including vertically integrated firms in the sample may affect the previous results.  In 
equilibrium, these firms likely have already solved issues related to transaction costs by 
integration and should be less likely to contract.  For robustness, I drop vertically integrated 
firms and re-run the empirical specifications in Table 6.  Similar to Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Mitton (2009), I use the COMPUSTAT segment tapes and the BEA IO Tables to construct a 
sales-weighted backward vertical integration measure, Vertical Relatedness, for each firm.  The 
variable is a proxy for the percentage of a firm’s input it can purchase from its own segments.  I 
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define a firm as Vertically Integrated if this integration measure is above 1% and drop them from 
the sample.
25
  The results are reported in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8] 
The various proxies for RSI (Supplier R&D Intensity, Patent Cross-citation Intensity, and 
Supplier Differentiated Goods) remain significantly positively related to the propensity to 
contract.  The coefficients on Relative Herf Index and Price Informativeness become statistically 
insignificant, and are weaker than in Table 6.  The coefficients on ln[Contracting Legal Rank] 
and Proximity, however, become stronger.  Overall, the results support the assertion that 
transaction costs are positively related to the probability of observing supplier-customer 
contracting. 
4.2. Contract Length 
[Insert Table 9] 
I examine the determinants of contract length in Table 9.  I use Poisson estimates in these 
tests because the dependent variable is a count variable.  However, as shown earlier in Table 4, 
the subsample of firms using contracts is systematically different than the entire sample.  Thus, 
Poisson estimates on the subsample may suffer from a sample selection bias.  To correct for 
sample selection, I estimate a first stage probit using Model 7 from Table 6 and compute the 
inverse mills ratio.  I include the inverse mills ratio in the second stage Poisson estimates on the 
subsample of firms using contracts.  As the two-step Heckman approach may understate standard 
errors in the second-stage (Moffett, 1999), I bootstrap the second-stage standard errors 100 
times.
26
  Model 1 examines the effect of Supplier R&D Intensity, Relative Herf Index, Price 
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 As an additional, unreported, robustness test, I also drop utility companies from the sample.  The results are 
consistent with those in Tables 5 and 7. 
26
 The above methodology assumes a normal distribution in the first stage and a Poisson distribution in the second 
stage.  I also estimate an endogenous switching Poisson model in the cross-section, which is a FIML estimation that 
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Informativeness, and Proximity on contract length using the entire sample of firm-years with 
supplier contracts.  Supplier R&D Intensity has a coefficient of 23.23 and is just outside 
statistical significance at 10%.  Relative Herf Index is significant at 10% percent with a 
coefficient of 0.13.  Price Informativeness has a coefficient of -0.57 and is significant at 5%.  
Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] is significantly positive at the 5% level, suggesting that contracts 
are written for longer terms in better contracting legal environments.  In Model 2, I drop firms 
defined as vertically integrated.  The results are similar to Model 1, although slightly stronger. 
Note that I control for alternative contracting possibilities and the propensity to vertically 
integrate in all specifications using % of Input Traded and Industry-Median Tangibility.  For 
robustness, I also estimate Poisson and Tobit models on the whole sample (a value of “0” for 
non-contracting firms).  The inferences from these models are similar to those presented above.   
4.3.Simultaneity 
Note that the theoretical models discussed above do not explicitly claim causality in any 
one direction.  Rather, the contract is an ex-ante solution to a potential ex-post hold-up problem, 
and the contract is agreed to by the customer to induce the supplier to make RSI.  Thus, it is 
highly likely that some or all of the transaction costs presented in this paper are simultaneously 
determined with Supplier Contracts.  Using both 3SLS and 2SLS simultaneous estimates, I do 
find evidence that Supplier R&D Intensity and Supplier Contract are both positively related to 
each other.  The results are reported in Table 10.   
[Insert Table 10] 
I utilize the customer firm’s aggregate industry R&D intensity, as well as supplier 
characteristics Supplier Herf Index, Supplier Sales Growth, and Supplier Industry Tobin’s Q as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
makes use of the entire sample with an endogenous dummy (Supplier Contract).  The results are similar to those 
reported in Table 9.   
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additional predictors of Supplier R&D.
27
  Although Supplier R&D Intensity continues to predict 
the propensity to contract, the existence of Supplier Contracts also affects the supplier’s decision 
to invest in RSI.  The evidence suggests that the existence of contracts induces supplier RSI, and 
the potential for supplier RSI generates the need for contracts.  Additionally, this evidence 
complements Moon (2012), who uses seemingly unrelated regressions to examine the 
simultaneity between purchase obligations and firm characteristics such as capital intensity and 
leverage. 
4.4.Cross-sectional tests 
Since the multivariate tests are estimated on a panel dataset, serial correlation is a 
potential concern, especially given that many firms continue contractual relationships with 
suppliers year-after-year.  As such, all standard errors are clustered by firm in most of the 
multivariate estimates in the paper.  However, for robustness, I run year-by-year tests and 
examine these cross-sectional estimates to ensure that any potential serial correlation is not 
overstating statistical significance.  In general, the results in Table 11 are consistent with Table 6, 
as they are statistically significant in most sample years.  However, the 2008 fiscal year generally 
has weaker results.  One explanation is that the financial crisis negatively affected corporate 
investment (Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey, 2011) and which affects empirical tests 
of corporate investment in this time period.  Additionally, the relation between % of Input 
Traded and Supplier Contracts appears strongest in the 2008 fiscal year.  This is potentially due 
to increased corporate hedging activity, as shown by Williams (2012).   
[Table 11] 
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 The results are not sensitive to the choice of exogenous variables.  They are robust to a wide range of different 
model specifications. 
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4.5.Industry Definitions 
In the main tests, I report HHI variables computed from Compustat using two-digit 
NAICS codes.  However, the literature has pointed to numerous issues caused by estimating 
Herfindahl-Hirschman indices (HHI) from Compustat data (Ali, Klasa, and Yeung, 2009; 
Hoberg and Phillips, 2010), primarily relating to Compustat’s exclusion of private companies.  
Therefore, I also estimate HHI using similar methodology to Hoberg and Phillips (2010).  The 
methodology is identical except that I use three-digit NAICS industry definitions (instead of 
SIC) and I use the 2007 Department of Commerce HHIs for my entire sample.  Using this 
definition weakens the results slightly, but they are qualitatively similar to results reported 
elsewhere in the paper.   
Additionally, I test that the results are robust to different industry definitions.  I generally 
use a broad definition of industry (two-digit NAICS) throughout the paper.  However, I also 
aggregate all of the weighted supplier industry-level variables (Supplier R&D Intensity, Supplier 
Differentiated Goods, Supplier Herfindahl Index, etc.) at the four-digit and six-digit level as 
well, and generate similar results as earlier.  The results at the six-digit level are somewhat 
weaker, although most variables remain statistically significant.  However, the bargaining power 
results do not hold if Supplier Herfindahl Index and Relative Herf Index are defined at the six-
digit level. 
5. Firm performance 
5.1.Supplier Contracts and Firm Performance 
In order to study normative implications of supplier-customer contracting, I next examine 
whether purchase agreements with suppliers affect the customer firm’s performance.  In Table 
12, I examine three measures of performance.  The first measure is operating return on assets, or 
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OROAt+1, which is EBITDA divided by total assets (Compustat variables EBITDA/AT).  The 
second performance measure is industry-adjusted operating return on assets, or Ind Adj OROAt+1, 
which is OROAt+1 minus the two digit NAICS industry-year median OROAt+1.  The last 
performance measure is firm value, which is Ind Adj Tobin’s Qt (Tobin’s Qt minus the two digit 
NAICS industry-year median Tobin’s Qt).   In all models, I control for R&D Intensity (Aggarwal 
and Samwick, 2006), Book Leverage (Opler and Titman, 1994), Sales Growth (Brush, Bromiley, 
and Hendrickx, 2000), ln[Assets] (Sufi, 2009), CAPEX (Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006), and 
Cash Holdings (Sufi, 2009), which is defined as cash divided by the book value of assets.  In 
specifications predicting operating performance, I also control for stock performance, although 
omitting this control does not significantly influence the results.  Thus, the general empirical 
model is: 
Operating Performancei,t+1 or Stock Performancei,t  = 0 + 1Supplier Contractsi,t  + 2R&D 
Intensityi,t + 3Book Leveragei,t + 4Sales Growthi,t + 5Ln[Assets],i,t + 6CAPEXi,t + 7Cash 
Holdingsi,t + Year dummies + Constant + i,t.                (3) 
Additionally, Tobin's Q is used a control variable in specifications where operating performance 
is the dependent variable. 
Models 1-3 use OLS regressions to examine the effect of Supplier Contracts on 
OROAt+1, Ind Adj OROAt+1, and Ind Adj Tobin’s Qt, respectively.  In Model 1, Supplier 
Contracts has a coefficient of 0.0150 and is significant at the 5% level.  In Model 2, Supplier 
Contracts has a coefficient of 0.0186 and is significant at the 1% level.  In Model 3, Supplier 
Contracts has a coefficient of 0.1725 and is significant at the 1% level.  Thus, in the OLS 
framework, purchase obligations to suppliers are associated with a 1.5% increase in OROAt+1, a 
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1.89% increase in Ind Adj OROAt+1, and a 0.1725 increase in firm value after controlling for 
other effects.   
[Insert Table 12] 
Note that the above results do not control for potential endogeneity.  For example, 
suppliers may only choose to contract with better-performing customers, or some unobserved 
factor could affect both contracting and performance.  In order to control for this possibility, I 
use an instrumental variables approach and a treatment effects estimation. In Models 4-6, I 
present 2SLS instrumental variables estimates for OROAt+1, Ind Adj OROAt+1, and Ind Adj 
Tobin’s Qt.  In Model 4, which predicts OROAt+1, Supplier Contracts has a coefficient of 0.2337 
and is significant at the 5% level, using the instruments Supplier R&D Intensity and 
ln[Contracting Legal Rank].  In Model 5, which predicts Ind Adj OROAt+1, Supplier Contracts 
has a coefficient of 0.3331 and is significant at the 1% level, using the instruments Supplier R&D 
Intensity and ln[Contracting Legal Rank].  Finally, in Model 6, which predicts Ind Adj Tobin’s 
Qt., Supplier Contracts has a coefficient of 21.0387 and is significant at the 1% level, using the 
instruments Supplier Herf Index and Price Informativeness.  Thus, the performance results 
appear robust to corrections for endogeneity using an instrumental variables approach.  Although 
I require the above instruments to pass statistical tests for overidentification, relevance, and 
validity and are selected from the independent variables used in Table 6, they must also pass the 
exclusion restriction (Roberts and Whited, 2012).  Arguably, Supplier R&D Intensity, Supplier 
Herf Index, and Price Informativeness may affect firm performance in ways other than through 
their effect on Supplier Contracts.  However, it is unlikely that ln[Contracting Legal Rank] 
affects firm performance in any way except through the firm’s contracting activity.  Therefore, I 
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also estimate an exactly identified system using ln[Contracting Legal Rank] as the lone 
instrument, and generate results similar to those presented in Table 12.
28
 
  For robustness, I also correct for endogeneity using a treatment effects approach.  A 
treatment effect estimation measures the average causal difference in performance under the 
control (non-purchase obligation firms) and the treated sample (purchase obligation firms).  The 
methodology has the advantage of allowing all transaction costs variables to predict Supplier 
Contract in the first stage.  Thus, I use the probit estimates in Model 7 in Table 6 as the first-
stage in the treatment effects estimation.  In Model 7, which predicts OROAt+1, Supplier 
Contract has a coefficient of 0.2467 and is significant at the 1% level.  In Model 8, which 
predicts Ind Adj OROAt+1, Supplier Contract has a coefficient of 0.3578 and is significant at the 
1% level.  Finally, Model 9, which predicts Ind Adj Tobin’s Qt., Supplier Contract has a 
coefficient of 2.1744 and is significant at the 1% level.  The results in the above section suggest 
that the use of purchase obligations with suppliers is positively related to firm performance and 
appear robust to traditional controls for endogeneity.
29
   
5.2.Firm Performance and RSI  
Another method to approach causality is to examine counterfactual evidence.  Namely, if 
there truly is a causal link between contracting and firm performance, what is the effect of 
contracts on performance when we should not observe contracts (and vice versa)?  Variation in 
the relation between contracting and performance, based on whether contracting should be 
observed or not, generates a stronger case for a causal relation. Additionally, counterfactual tests 
would address a related question regarding the equilibrium: if purchase agreements affect 
                                                          
28
 In fact, Roberts and Whited (2012) argue that this might be a better technique than using an overidentifed system.  
Although using multiple instruments allows one to perform overidenfication tests, Roberts and Whited (2012) point 
out that it is generally difficult for researchers to identify even one good instrument.   
29
 Note that these results are much weaker (although generally still significant at the 10% level) when controlling for 
firm fixed effects. 
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performance, why don’t all firms make the same decision?  Any counterfactual evidence would 
suggest that contracting is not optimal for all firms, and we would observe possibly worse 
performance for firms which are using contracts but should not be using them.   
I examine this possibility in Table 13, where I present treatment effects estimates in 
subsamples of firms with above sample year-median RSI measures (Supplier R&D Intensity, 
Supplier Differentiated Goods, and R&D Intensity).
30
  Cases where the RSI measures are high 
represent environments where we should observe contracting, and cases where RSI is low 
represent environments where we do not expect to see contracting.  Note that in all models, the 
existence of supplier contracts enhances firm value (Ind-Adj Qt+1) when the measure of RSI is 
above the sample-year median.  Additionally, the existence of such contracts when RSI is low 
reduces firm value.  The difference in coefficients across the two subsamples is also statistically 
significant.  We do, then, observe that when contracts are used as predicted by economic theory, 
they have a positive effect on performance.  In counterfactual cases, they negatively affect 
performance.  Thus, it does not appear optimal for all firms to use contracts.  Additionally, the 
tests in Table 13 provide some support for a causal relation between contracting and firm 
performance.   
[Insert Table 13] 
6. Supplier contracts and vertical integration 
Vertical integration is an alternative solution for hold-up problems.  The decision to 
vertically integrate is well researched in both the finance and economics literature.  Recent 
theoretical research (e.g., Whinston, 2003) and empirical studies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Mitton, 2009; Shenoy, 2012) examine the vertical integration decision as a solution to a number 
                                                          
30
 I also estimate similar specifications using OLS and IV methods.  These are omitted for brevity but are available 
upon request from the author.   
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of hold-up problems.
31
  Vertical integration is especially likely when contracting costs are high.  
In this subsection's main set of empirical tests, I model the choice between contracting versus 
vertical integration.  To my knowledge, these determinants have never been tested jointly.  
Additionally, I examine how firms adjust their boundaries in response to an industry-wide human 
capital shock in the form of a sudden industry-wide R&D increase. 
6.1. Hypotheses 
Similar to Hypothesis 1 which predicts RSI as a determinant of contracting, RSI is also 
frequently used a determinant of vertical integration.  Many studies (Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas, 
2006; Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Shenoy, 2012, among many others) use R&D intensity to proxy 
for RSI.  However, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009) instead use a measure of asset 
tangibility as their measure of RSI predicting vertical integration.  Their argument is that 
integration may lead to underinvestment in human capital by employees (Grossman and Hart, 
1986; Hart and Moore, 1990).
  
Thus, hold-up problems associated with physical investment or 
high capital intensity may be easier to solve with integration as this type of investment is often 
not associated with high amounts of human capital.  However, in firms (or supply chains) where 
human capital is important, integration costs are likely to be relatively higher.
 32
  All else equal, 
hold-up problems associated with high R&D firms and high R&D supply chains may be better 
solved with contracts than with integration.  I predict that the propensity to contract versus 
integrate is increasing in supplier R&D intensity, Supplier R&D Intensity and firm R&D 
                                                          
31
 Brickley, Linck, and Smith Jr. (2012) examine vertical mergers in the financial sector and find that integration 
may also occur for competitive reasons such as when a supplier is also a potential competitor. 
32
 Seru (2011) also finds a similar effect in conglomerates.  That is, investment requiring large amounts of human 
capital, measured by patent intensity, is less efficient inside a conglomerate.  Conglomerates mitigate this problem 
by moving the R&D intensive investment outside of the firm through the use of strategic alliances and joint 
ventures. 
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intensity, R&D Intensity. Further, I predict that the propensity to contract versus integrate is 
decreasing in Industry-Median Tangibility.   
 In earlier tests, Proximity is negatively related to the propensity to contract—a result 
consistent with the notion that information asymmetry increases with distance, and inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that site-specific investment positively relates to supplier-customer 
contracting.  However, another explanation is that many problems generated by site specificity 
are so severe that integration is needed to solve the hold-up problem as distance decreases.  If so, 
I predict the propensity to contract is decreasing in Proximity and the propensity to vertically 
integrate is increasing in Proximity.   
Contracting costs also affect the decision to integrate.  In environments where contracting 
is difficult and costly, a firm may instead choose to vertically integrate.  A large body of 
theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that vertical integration is positively related to 
explicit contracting costs (e.g. Coase, 1937; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian,1978; Fee, Hadlock, 
and Thomas, 2006; among others).  I predict that the propensity to contract versus integrate is 
increasing in ln[Contracting Legal Rank].   
Finally, supplier and customer industry concentration may affect the decision to integrate.  
If regulators oppose integration between highly concentrated industries for foreclosure or 
collusion reasons (see Shenoy (2012) for a discussion of this literature), both Supplier Herfindahl 
Index and Relative Herf Index should positively affect the propensity to contract versus vertically 
integrate. 
6.2. Multivariate tests - vertical integration 
I next examine these hypotheses in two ways.  First, in Section 6.2.1, I consider a 
subsample of firms which are either vertically integrated or which use supplier contracts.  I then 
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examine the effect of the above forces on a firm’s propensity to either be vertically integrated or 
to contract.  However, it is unlikely that the subsample of firms which are vertically integrated or 
contracting are randomly assigned, which creates the possibility of a sample selection bias.  
Therefore, in Section 6.2.2, I use a two-stage Heckman-type probit framework to better identify 
the contract/vertical integration choice.  I first model the firm’s decision to do “something” (i.e. 
either contract or vertically integrate) and in the second stage I examine the choice between 
contracting or vertical integration.  Both sets of tests are discussed below. 
 [Insert Table 14] 
 
6.2.1 Probit Results 
Table 14 contains the multivariate results.  Models 1 and 2 are probit estimates on a 
subsample of firms which are vertically integrated or use supplier contracts.  In this specification, 
the dependent variable is equal to one if a firm uses contracts and zero if a firm is vertically 
integrated and does not use contracts.  A firm is considered vertically integrated if it at least has a 
backward vertical relatedness coefficient of 1% (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton, 2009).  In 
Models 1 and 2, Supplier R&D Intensity and R&D Intensity are positively related to the 
propensity to contract, while Industry-Median Tangibility is negatively related.  Relative Herf 
Index is positive and significant, as is Supplier Herfindahl Index.  The firm’s own industry 
Herfindahl Index is negative but insignificant.  The proxy for contracting costs, ln[Contracting 
Legal Rank], and Proximity fail to significantly predict contracts versus integration.  Therefore, it 
appears that contracts are more likely than vertical integration at higher levels of intangible 
investment, and vertical integration is more likely than contracts in the presence of high levels of 
tangible investment. 
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6.2.2. Two-stage results 
For both sets of results, I estimate a first-stage probit model.  The dependent variable is 
equal to one if a firm is either vertically integrated or uses contracts and zero otherwise.  Models 
3 and 5 contain the first stage estimates.  I include all variables from Table 6, Model 7 in the first 
stage except for variables expected to predict the choice between contracts and vertical 
integration.  Thus, Supplier R&D Intensity, Industry-Median Tangibility, Proximity, and 
ln[Contracting Legal Rank] are omitted from the first stage because there are no clear 
predictions on their effect on the choice between markets and contracts/integration.  Relative 
Herf Index, or Supplier Herfindahl Index and Herfindahl Index are included in the first stage 
because the hypotheses relating to contracting versus vertical integration are not directly related 
to the bargaining hypothesis discussed in the hypothesis section.  Models 4 and 6 present the 
second stage probit estimates, which control for sample selection by including the inverse mills 
ratio from the first stage.  The second-stage dependent variable is equal to one if the firm uses 
contracts, and zero if the firm is vertically integrated and does not contract.
33
  In Model 4, which 
predicts the propensity to contract versus integration, Supplier R&D Intensity is significantly 
positive at 1%.  Industry-Median Tangibility is negatively related and significant at 10%, and 
Relative Herf Index is positive and significant at 5%.  Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] and 
Proximity remain insignificant.   Finally, Model 6 is identical to Model 4, except Supplier Herf 
Index and the firm’s own industry Herfindahl Index replace Relative Herf Index.  Supplier R&D 
Intensity is significantly positive at 1%.  Industry-Median Tangibility is negatively related and 
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 In the main results, the few firms that have both contracts and are vertically integrated are dropped.  In unreported 
tests, I confirm that including these firms either as “contracting” firms or as “integrated” firms does not affect the 
results.  I have also confirmed the results in Table 14 using a multinomial logit model.  I am unable to estimate a 
nested logit model because I do not have unique independent variables for each outcome. 
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significant at 10%.  Supplier Herfindahl Index and the firm’s own industry Herfindahl Index are 
insignificant.  In general, the results confirm the earlier hypotheses.  RSI in the form of 
intangible investment appears to have higher integration costs; suppliers and customers are more 
likely to use contracts.  However, when RSI is in the form of tangible investment, integration 
costs are lower and firms are relatively more likely to be vertically integrated. 
6.3. Industry R&D & CAPEX shocks 
In tables 15 and 16, I examine whether industry-wide shocks to required investment have 
subsequent effects on vertical firm boundaries.  I define dummy variables, Positive (Negative) 
Industry R&D Shock, as equal to one if the aggregate R&D Intensity of a firm’s two-digit 
industry increased (decreased) by at least 10% in a given year, and Positive (Negative) Industry 
CAPEX Shock, as equal to one if the aggregate CAPEX of a firm’s two-digit industry increased 
(decreased) by at least 10% in a given year.  I then examine whether there is a subsequent impact 
on firm boundaries.  Specifically, I examine whether there is a complete change in contracting 
status (going from no contracts to using contracts, and vice-versa) or in vertical integration status 
(going from non-vertically integrated to vertically integrated, and vice-versa).  In Models 1-4, I 
define indicator variables Get Supplier Contractt+1, Lose Supplier Contractt+1, Vertically 
Integratet+1, and Vertically Disintegratet+1, which are equal to one if a firm gets a supplier 
contract, loses a supplier contract, becomes vertically integrated, or vertically disintegrates, 
respectively  in a given year.   
Generally speaking, the industry shock dummy variables do not have strong statistical 
influences on these measures of large changes to firm boundaries, except that Positive Industry 
R&D Shock positively predicts the propensity to Get Supplier Contractt+1 at the 10% level, and 
Negative Industry CAPEX Shock negatively (positively) predicts the propensity to Get (Lose) 
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Supplier Contractt+1 at the 10% level.  This evidence may suggest that firm boundaries, on 
average, do not dramatically change over short periods of time.  Thus, I utilize finer measures of 
changes in firm boundaries to investigate the effect of industry R&D shocks.  I construct Percent 
Dollar Changet,t+1 which is the percentage increase in the dollar amount of the contractual 
commitment two years into the future at time t, to the dollar amount of the commitment one year 
into the future at time t+1.
34
  In other words, Percent Dollar Changet,t+1 captures the change in 
contracting intensity for a fixed point in the future.  When Percent Dollar Changet,t+1 increases, 
a firm has increased its contracting activity in dollar terms.  I also construct Integration 
Coefficient Changet,t+1, which is the change in a firm's backward vertical relatedness coefficient 
from year t to t+1.  Increases in Integration Coefficient Changet,t+1 indicate that a firm has 
become more vertically integrated. 
[Insert Table 15] 
[Insert Table 16] 
Utilizing Percent Dollar Changet,t+1 and Integration Coefficient Changet,t+1 allow an 
examination of subtler changes in firm boundaries.  One can examine shifts in contracting 
intensity and degree of vertical integration rather than dramatic shifts such as vertically 
integrated to not.  The results with these two variables are presented in Models 5 and 6.  In Panel 
A of Table 15, Percent Dollar Changet,t+1  is significantly positively related to Positive Industry 
R&D Shock at the 5% level, indicating that industry R&D spikes cause increases in contracting 
activity in dollar terms.  Integration Coefficient Changet,t+1 is significantly negatively related to 
Positive Industry R&D Shock, which suggests that spikes in industry R&D cause a reduction in 
vertical integration. In Panel B of Table 15, Percent Dollar Changet,t+1  is not significantly 
                                                          
34
 To illustrate, suppose a firm is obligated to purchase $1million in 2010 as of their 2008 year end.  If, as of the 
firm's 2009 year-end, they are now obligated to purchase $1.5 million in 2010, DollarChanget,t+1 is equal to 50%. 
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related to Negative Industry R&D Shock, but Integration Coefficient Changet,t+1 is significantly 
positively related to Negative Industry R&D Shock, which suggests that downward spikes in 
industry R&D positively relate to increases in vertical integration.  In Panel A of Table 16, I find 
that Percent Dollar Changet,t+1  is significantly negatively related to Positive Industry CAPEX 
Shock at the 1% level, indicating that industry CAPEX spikes are related to decreases in 
contracting activity in dollar terms.  Integration Coefficient Changet,t+1 is significantly positively 
related to Positive Industry CAPEX Shock.  Finally, in Panel B of Table 16, I find that 
Integration Coefficient Changet,t+1 is significantly negatively related to Negative Industry 
CAPEX Shock.   
As a whole, the results in Section 6 are consistent with the hypothesis that different types 
of RSI are associated with different hold-up problems requiring different solutions.  Thus, 
Supplier R&D Intensity and R&D Intensity appear to capture a type of RSI solved relatively 
easier by contracting, due to the integration costs associated with human capital (e.g., Hart and 
Moore, 1990; Grossman and Hart, 1986).  These results are also consistent with the evidence in 
Seru (2011), who finds that conglomerates (including vertically integrated firms) move R&D 
intensive activity outside of the firm using strategic alliances and joint ventures.  Industry-
Median Tangibility represents investment less affected by integration cost; thus, integration 
appears relatively better at solving hold-up problems associated with capital intensive 
investment.  Relative industry concentration and supplier industry concentration are positively 
related to the propensity to contract relative to integration, but a firm’s own industry 
concentration is insignificantly negative.  This is consistent with the view that competitive 
industries find it difficult to acquire a supplier in a concentrated industry, but I do not find 
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evidence of regulatory pressure.
35
  Additionally, I find some evidence that firms adjust their 
boundaries in response to industry-level shocks to the type of investment required. 
7. Conclusions 
Using a unique database built from 10-K filings, I empirically examine the question: why 
do firms enter into explicit contacts as opposed to using markets to exchange goods and 
services?  To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study in financial economics exploring 
this question directly.  I draw testable hypotheses from extant theory and then empirically 
examine the determinants of a firm’s explicit contracts with suppliers.  Theory predicts that the 
propensity to contract should be increasing in relationship-specific investments, the supplier’s 
relative bargaining power, supplier-customer proximity, and vertical integration costs.  The 
propensity to contract should be decreasing in stock price informativeness, and contracting costs.  
I also examine the determinants of the length of these supplier-customer contracts as well as 
investigate the impact of these contracts on firm performance.   
Consistent with the above predictions, I find evidence that supplier relationship-specific 
investments, the supplier’s relative bargaining power, and vertical integration costs are positively 
related to the propensity for suppliers and customers to contract, yet customer stock price 
informativeness, contracting costs, the proximity of suppliers and customers to each other, and 
the percentage of a customer’s input traded on financial markets are negatively related to the 
propensity to contract.  I also find that contract length is increasing in relationship-specific 
investments, supplier relative bargaining power, and vertical integration costs.  Contract length is 
decreasing in stock price informativeness, contracting costs, and the percentage of a customer’s 
input traded on financial markets.  These collective results support the prediction that transaction 
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 This lack of evidence of regulatory pressures could be unique to the 2003-2008 sample period. 
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costs shape firm boundaries through supplier-customer contracting activity.  Additionally, I 
investigate the impact of these contracts on firm performance. 
I also explore the choice between contracts and vertical integration.  I use a two-stage 
framework to examine which method a firm uses in equilibrium.  Additionally, I examine 
industry R&D and CAPEX shocks to examine how firms modify their contracting and 
integration status.  I find that relationship-specific investments in the form of tangible assets are 
negatively related to the propensity to contract versus vertically integrate, but relationship-
specific investments defined as R&D intensity are positively related to the propensity to contract 
versus integrate.  I also find that industry-level positive (negative) R&D shocks increase 
(decrease) contracting intensity in dollar terms and reduce (increase) the degree of vertical 
integration.  This is consistent with theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), 
which predicts that integration creates an incentive for firms to under invest in human capital, 
and is also consistent with recent empirical evidence in Seru (2011).  My evidence suggests that 
hold-up problems associated with non-human capital intensive RSI are more likely to be solved 
through integration rather than contracting.  Firms with human capital intensive RSI are likely to 
have high integration costs and are more likely to contract rather than integrate.  I contribute to 
the literature in the following ways.  Although the extant literature examines alternative solutions 
for hold-up problems (vertical integration, partial ownership, and joint ventures), this study 
examines the determinants of explicit product market contracts.  In doing so, I also find support 
for the assertion in Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) that the information derived from stock 
prices is likely to be about the demand for the firm’s products or about its strategic landscape.  
Additionally, I empirically examine a firm’s choice between contracts and vertical integration, 
and show that hold-up problems associated with different types of relationship-specific 
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investments have different solutions.  Finally, I build a comprehensive panel database containing 
all U.S. public companies.  In doing so, I extend previous empirical research in the extant 
literature which has generally been limited to data for a single year and/or a single industry.  
Overall, this study examines a previously unexplored area of financial economics, and the results 
suggest many opportunities for future research.  
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Appendix A 
Examples of Footnote Disclosures 
The following is an example of the “Contractual obligations” footnote in AAR Corp for fiscal year 2005.  
The “Purchase obligations” line item is the line item collected using the Perl scripting language. 
 
 
Contractual Obligations and Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements 
A summary of contractual obligations and off-balance sheet arrangements as of May 31, 2005 is as follows: 
  
Payments Due by Period 
 
    
Due in 
 
Due in 
 
Due in 
 
Due in 
 
Due in 
 
After 
 
    
Fiscal 
 
Fiscal 
 
Fiscal 
 
Fiscal 
 
Fiscal 
 
Fiscal 
 
  
Total 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2010 
 
On Balance Sheet: 
               
Debt 
 
$ 200,632 
 
$ 713 
 
$ 743 
 
$ 68,157 
 
$ 8,716 
 
$ 200 
 
$ 122,103 
 
Non-recourse Debt 
 
28,862 
 
1,622 
 
1,928 
 
2,047 
 
2,173 
 
21,092 
 
— 
 
Bank Borrowings 
 
1,410 
 
1,410 
 
— 
 
— 
 
— 
 
— 
 
— 
 
Off Balance Sheet: 
               
Aviation Equipment 
               
Operating Leases 
 
38,149 
 
10,887 
 
18,302 
 
3,840 
 
3,840 
 
1,280 
 
— 
 
Facilities and Equipment 
               
Operating Leases 
 
25,408 
 
6,521 
 
6,293 
 
5,223 
 
3,995 
 
3,205 
 
171 
 
Garden City Operating 
Lease 
 
31,783 
 
1,388 
 
1,423 
 
1,458 
 
1,495 
 
1,532 
 
24,487 
 
Purchase Obligations 
 
75,555 
 
71,085 
 
3,657 
 
718 
 
42 
 
37 
 
16  
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Appendix B 
Examples of Problems with Footnote Disclosures 
Below is Coca-Cola’s 2010 10-K filing for fiscal year 2008.  Coca-Cola combines some future years, 
making an exact determination of contract length difficult for automatically collected data. 
 
Aggregate Contractual Obligations  
        As of December 31, 2008, the Company's contractual obligations, including payments due by period, were as 
follows (in millions):  
   Payments Due by Period     
   
  Total    2009    2010-2011    2012-2013    
2014 and 
Thereafter  
    
Short-term loans and notes payable
1
:                                 
  Commercial paper borrowings     $    5,389    $    5,389    $        —    $        —    $        —  
  Lines of credit and other short-term borrowings    677    677    —    —    —  
Current maturities of long-term debt
2     465    465    —    —    —  
Long-term debt, net of current maturities
2     2,781    —    620    265    1,896  
Estimated interest payments
3     1,707    163    273    219    1,052  
Accrued income taxes
4     252    252    —    —    —  
Purchase obligations
5     10,737    7,041    1,221    517    1,958  
Marketing obligations
6     4,464    1,910    1,061    658    835  
Lease obligations     631    174    231    108    118  
    
  Total contractual obligations4     $  27,103    $  16,071    $    3,406    $    1,767    $    5,859 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Summary statistics using 19,749 Compustat firms which filed 10-K reports for their fiscal years 2003-2008.  Financial firms are 
excluded.    Supplier Contracts is a dummy variable equal to "1" if a firm reports purchase obligations in their 10-K, and "0" otherwise.  
Length of Contract is equal to the number of years into the future a firm reports purchase obligations to its suppliers.  The percentage 
amount by years break out the dollar amounts committed to as a percentage of COGS.  Supplier Herfindahl Index is the weighted-average 
of all supplier industry Herfindahl Indices, weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Supplier R&D Intensity is 
the weighted-average of all supplier industry's R&D/Total Assets, weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  
Supplier Differentiated Goods proxies for the heterogeneity of a firm's inputs.  I first define a supplier industry as either producing 
differentiated output or not (using the Rauch, 1999 definitions) and then weight each supplier industry's output type by the importance of 
each supplier industry to the firm.  Patent Cross-citation Intensity is the percentage of supplier industries which have patent cross-
citations with the firm's own industry.  % of Input Traded proxies for the percentage of a firm's input which is traded on financial 
markets.  I code supplier industries whose output trades on a financial exchange equal to "1", and "0" otherwise, and then define % of 
Input Traded as the weighted-average of all supplier industries, weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.   
Proximity is the additive inverse of the supplier weighted-average transportation costs from the input-output tables.     Contracting Legal 
Rank is the contract enforcement ranking for the firm's home state (1 is the worst and 50 is the best).  Industry-Median Tangibility is the 
2-digit NAICS industry-year median tangibility ratio (Net PPE/Total Assets).  Herfindahl Index is the firm's own 2-digit NAICS industry 
concentration. Price Informativeness is the firm's stock price informativeness.  R&D Intensity is RD/Total Assets.  Backward Integration 
is the firm’s sales-based vertical integration coefficient (Acemoglu, Mitton, and Johnson, 2009).  Book Leverage is long-term debt and 
current portion of long-term debt divided by book assets.  Sales Growth is the firm's sales growth.   Assets is a firm's book assets in 
millions, and Tobin's Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets.  All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
    Mean   Median   Min   Max   Observations 
Dependent Variable 
          Supplier Contracts 
 
0.20 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
19749 
           Length of Contract 
 
2.49 
 
3.00 
 
1.00 
 
6.00 
 
4010 
           Percentage Amount by Year: 
         
           Year t+1 
 
0.12 
 
0.07 
 
0.00 
 
0.46 
 
3966 
           Year t+2 
 
0.07 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.73 
 
3966 
           Year t+3 
 
0.05 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.50 
 
3966 
           Year t+4 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.07 
 
3966 
           Year t+5 & onward 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
3966 
           
           Supplier Industry Characteristics 
        Supplier Herfindahl Index 0.04 
 
0.04 
 
0.02 
 
0.32 
 
19749 
           Supplier R&D Intensity 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 
 
0.03 
 
19749 
           Supplier Differentiated Goods 0.27 
 
0.23 
 
0.03 
 
0.66 
 
19749 
           Patent Cross-citation Intensity 0.03 
 
0.00 
 
0.03 
 
0.42 
 
13109 
           % of Input Traded 
 
0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.58 
 
19749 
           Proximity 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.18 
 
0.00 
 
19436 
           
          
Continued… 
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Table 1 (continued) 
          Firm's Industry Characteristics 
         Industry-Median Tangibility 0.21 
 
0.13 
 
0.00 
 
0.81 
 
19744 
           Herfindahl Index 
 
0.04 
 
0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.43 
 
19749 
           % Import 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.03 
 
19749 
           
           Firm Characteristics 
          Contracting Legal Rank 20.27 
 
18.00 
 
1.00 
 
50.00 
 
18898 
           Price Informativeness 
 
0.75 
 
0.83 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
17349 
           R&D Intensity 
 
0.08 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.99 
 
19749 
           Backward Integration 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.80 
 
19749 
           Book Leverage 
 
0.24 
 
0.17 
 
0.00 
 
2.07 
 
19749 
           Sales Growth 
 
0.13 
 
0.15 
 
-1.00 
 
0.81 
 
19749 
           Assets (in millions) 
 
2163.34 
 
2163.34 
 
1.02 
 
38593.00 
 
19749 
           Tobin's Q   2.40   1.61   0.54   20.27   19749 
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Table 2 
Correlation table 
Correlation table using 19,749 Compustat firms which filed 10-K reports for their fiscal years 2003-2008.  
Financial firms are excluded.    Supplier Contracts is a dummy variable equal to "1" if a firm reports 
purchase obligations in their 10-K, and "0" otherwise.  Vertically Integrated is equal to one if the firm has a 
backward integration coefficient greater than 1%.  Supplier Herfindahl Index is the weighted-average of all 
supplier industry Herfindahl Indices, weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  
Supplier R&D Intensity is the weighted-average of all supplier industry's R&D/Total Assets, weighted by 
the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Supplier Differentiated Goods proxies for the 
heterogeneity of a firm's inputs.  I first define a supplier industry as either producing differentiated output 
or not (using the Rauch, 1999 definitions) and then weight each supplier industry's output type by the 
importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Patent Cross-citation Intensity is the percentage of 
supplier industries which have patent cross-citations with the firm's own industry.  % of Input Traded 
proxies for the percentage of a firm's input which is traded on financial markets.  I code supplier industries 
whose output is traded on a financial exchange equal to "1", and "0" otherwise, and then define % of Input 
Traded as the weighted-average of all supplier industries, weighted by the importance of each supplier 
industry to the firm.  Contracting Legal Rank is the contract enforcement ranking for the firm's home state 
(1 is the worst and 50 is the best).  Industry-Median Tangibility is the 2-digit NAICS industry-year median 
tangibility ratio (Net PPE/Total Assets).  Herfindahl Index is the firm's own 2-digit NAICS industry 
concentration. Price Informativeness is the firm's stock price informativeness.  R&D Intensity is RD/Total 
Assets.  Book leverage is long-term debt and current portion of long-term debt divided by book assets.     
Sales Growth is the firm's own industry sales growth.   Ln[Assets] is the natural logarithm of a firm's book 
assets in millions.  All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
 
Supplier 
Contracts Vertically Int Supplier R&D 
Patent Cross-
cite 
Supplier Contracts 1.00 
   Vertically Integrated 0.04 1.00 
  Supplier R&D Intensity 0.07 -0.13 1.00 
 Patent Cross-citation Int 0.01 -0.05 0.17 1.00 
Supplier Differentiated 
Goods 0.03 -0.16 0.68 0.26 
Relative Herf Index 0.03 -0.03 0.10 0.00 
Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.06 
Price Informativeness -0.11 -0.17 0.03 0.06 
Proximity -0.05 -0.06 -0.30 -0.09 
% of Input Traded -0.02 0.11 -0.07 -0.05 
Industry-Median Tangibility -0.05 0.11 -0.36 -0.09 
% Imports -0.02 -0.10 -0.05 0.07 
Herfindahl Index -0.04 0.05 -0.33 -0.07 
Book Leverage 0.00 0.06 -0.09 -0.09 
R&D Intensity -0.05 -0.14 0.07 0.11 
Sales Growth -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.07 
Ln[Assets] 0.14 0.23 -0.08 -0.09 
     
 
Supplier Diff 
Relative Herf 
Index Ln[Contracting] Price Infor 
Supplier Differentiated 
Goods 1.00 
   Relative Herf Index -0.02 1.00 
  Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] -0.07 -0.02 1.00 
 Price Informativeness 0.12 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Proximity -0.19 0.05 -0.03 0.14 
    
Continued... 
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Table 2 (continued) 
    % of Input Traded -0.28 0.06 0.03 -0.12 
Industry-Median Tangibility -0.24 -0.10 -0.02 -0.19 
% Imports 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.19 
Herfindahl Index -0.26 -0.66 0.01 -0.04 
Book Leverage -0.15 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 
R&D Intensity 0.27 -0.02 -0.10 0.24 
Sales Growth -0.08 0.10 -0.03 -0.03 
Ln[Assets] -0.17 0.01 0.02 -0.67 
     
 
Proximity 
% of Input 
Traded 
Industry-Med 
Tang % Imports 
Proximity 1.00 
   % of Input Traded -0.23 1.00 
  Industry-Median Tangibility -0.07 0.20 1.00 
 % Imports 0.19 -0.15 -0.20 1.00 
Herfindahl Index 0.15 -0.02 0.16 -0.02 
Book Leverage -0.03 0.09 0.17 -0.10 
R&D Intensity 0.01 -0.14 -0.20 0.39 
Sales Growth 0.12 -0.05 0.09 -0.03 
Ln[Assets] -0.11 0.17 0.18 -0.16 
     
 
Herf Index Book Leverage R&D Intensity Sales Growth 
Herfindahl Index 1.00 
   Book Leverage 0.07 1.00 
  R&D Intensity -0.08 -0.07 1.00 
 Sales Growth -0.01 0.01 -0.07 1.00 
Ln[Assets] 0.00 0.22 -0.40 0.01 
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Table 3 
Distribution of supplier contracting 
Univariate statistics using Compustat firms which filed 10-K reports for their fiscal years 2003-2008.  Financial firms are 
excluded.  A firm is defined as using Supplier Contracts if a firm reports purchase obligations in their 10-K, and "0" 
otherwise.  The table reports the percentage of firms using Supplier Contracts by industry type using Fama-French 48-
industry codes, sorted in ascending order of the percentage of firm-years which have upstream contracts.   
  
Contracting 
 
No 
Contracting 
 
Total Number 
 
FF Industry 
Code 
         Shipping Containers 0.40 
 
0.60 
 
65 
 
39 
Business Supplies 0.38 
 
0.63 
 
240 
 
38 
Shipbuilding and Railroad 0.35 
 
0.65 
 
62 
 
25 
Aircraft 
 
0.34 
 
0.66 
 
110 
 
24 
Precious Metals 0.32 
 
0.68 
 
77 
 
27 
Printing and Publishing 0.31 
 
0.69 
 
203 
 
8 
Defense 
 
0.30 
 
0.70 
 
46 
 
26 
Construction Materials 0.30 
 
0.70 
 
390 
 
17 
Electrical Equipment 0.29 
 
0.71 
 
419 
 
22 
Consumer Goods 0.28 
 
0.72 
 
334 
 
9 
Communication 0.28 
 
0.72 
 
817 
 
32 
Steel 
 
0.28 
 
0.72 
 
315 
 
19 
Construction 
 
0.27 
 
0.73 
 
297 
 
18 
Beer and Liquor 0.26 
 
0.74 
 
61 
 
4 
Chemicals 
 
0.24 
 
0.76 
 
494 
 
14 
Electronic Equipment 0.24 
 
0.76 
 
1603 
 
36 
Fabricated Products 0.24 
 
0.76 
 
59 
 
20 
Rubber and Plastic 0.23 
 
0.77 
 
184 
 
15 
Apparel 
 
0.22 
 
0.78 
 
349 
 
10 
Machinery 
 
0.22 
 
0.78 
 
740 
 
21 
Autos 
 
0.22 
 
0.78 
 
346 
 
23 
Restaurants & Hotels 0.21 
 
0.79 
 
452 
 
43 
Transportation 
 
0.21 
 
0.79 
 
696 
 
40 
Food 
 
0.20 
 
0.80 
 
373 
 
2 
Medical Equipment 0.20 
 
0.80 
 
915 
 
12 
Measuring and Control Equipment 0.20 
 
0.80 
 
560 
 
37 
Pharmaceutical 0.19 
 
0.81 
 
1979 
 
13 
Wholesale 
 
0.18 
 
0.82 
 
882 
 
41 
Computers 
 
0.18 
 
0.82 
 
1093 
 
35 
Business Services 0.17 
 
0.83 
 
2683 
 
34 
Recreation 
 
0.16 
 
0.84 
 
187 
 
6 
Candy and Soda 0.15 
 
0.85 
 
52 
 
3 
Personal Services 0.14 
 
0.86 
 
139 
 
33 
Entertainment 
 
0.13 
 
0.87 
 
335 
 
7 
Utilities 
 
0.12 
 
0.88 
 
614 
 
31 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.12 
 
0.88 
 
1060 
 
30 
Coal 
 
0.09 
 
0.91 
 
64 
 
29 
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Table 3 (continued) 
       Other 
 
0.07 
 
0.93 
 
219 
 
48 
Retail 
 
0.07 
 
0.93 
 
30 
 
42 
Mining 
 
0.05 
 
0.95 
 
93 
 
28 
Textiles 
 
0.05 
 
0.95 
 
82 
 
16 
Tobacco   0.00   1.00   30   5 
Total firm-years 
    
19749 
  
65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Sample characteristics:  Contract users and non-users 
Sample differences between contract users and non-users using Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms are 
excluded.  A firm is defined as using Supplier Contracts if a firm reports purchase obligations in their 10-K, and zero 
otherwise.  Assets is the firm's book assets (in millions), and Tobin's Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value 
of assets.  Cash is cash holdings divided by total assets.  Book Leverage is long-term debt and current portion of long-term 
debt divided by book assets.   Sales Growth is the firm's own industry sales growth and ROA is net income divided by total 
assets.  R&D Intensity is R&D/Total Assets.  All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
          
Variable 
 
Firms with Supplier 
Contracts 
 
Firms without Supplier 
Contracts 
 
Difference in Means 
  
Mean N 
 
Mean  N 
 
Difference t-statistic 
Assets 
 
3204 4,010   1859 15,739   1345*** 13.41 
          Tobin's Q 
 
2.181 4,010 
 
2.451 15,739 
 
-0.270*** 5.65 
          Cash 
 
0.143 3,984 
 
0.162 15,631 
 
-0.019*** 5.98 
          Book Leverage 
 
0.224 4,010 
 
0.247 15,739 
 
-0.023*** 4.08 
          Sales Growth 
 
0.118 3,780 
 
0.129 13,569 
 
-0.012*** 3.06 
          ROA 
 
-0.034 4,010 
 
-0.149 15,739 
 
0.115*** 12.33 
          R&D Intensity   0.061 4,010   0.083 15,739   -0.023*** 7.82 
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Table 5 
Univariate tests:  Supplier contracts and transaction costs 
Univariate tests using Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms are excluded.    A firm is defined as using Supplier Contracts if a firm reports 
purchase obligations in their 10-K, and zero otherwise. Supplier R&D Intensity is the weighted-average of all supplier industry's R&D/Total Assets, 
weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Supplier Differentiated Goods is the percentage of supplier output which is 
differentiated.  I first define a supplier industry as either producing differentiated output or not (based on the Rauch, 1999 definitions) and then weight 
each supplier industry's output type by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.    Patent Cross-citation Intensity is the percentage of 
supplier industries with patent cross-citation to a firm's own industry.  Relative Herf Index measures relative bargaining power and is the ratio of 
Supplier Herfindahl Index to the firm's own industry Herfindahl Index.  Contracting Legal Rank is the contract enforcement ranking for the firm's 
home state (1 is the worst and 50 is the best).  Price Informativeness is the firm's own stock price informativeness measure.  Proximity is the additive 
inverse of the supplier weighted-average transportation costs from the input-output tables.   All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
            Variable 
 
Firms with supplier contracts 
 
Firms without supplier contracts 
 
Difference in Means 
  
Mean Median N 
 
Mean  Median N 
 
Difference t-value 
Supplier R&D Intensity 
 
0.017 0.017 4,010   0.015 0.015 15,739   0.001*** 10.36 
            Supplier Differentiated 
Goods 
 
0.282 0.236 4,010 
 
0.269 0.233 15,739 
 
0.013*** 4.62 
            Patent Cross-Citation 
Intensity 
 
0.028 0.000 2,711 
 
0.025 0.000 10,398 
 
0.003* 1.85 
            Relative Herf Index 
 
1.677 1.719 4,010 
 
1.631 0.167 15,739 
 
0.046*** 3.85 
            Contracting Legal Rank 
 
20.809 19.000 3,835 
 
20.135 18.000 15,063 
 
0.675*** 2.83 
            Price Informativeness 
 
0.692 0.762 3,780 
 
0.765 0.847 13,569 
 
-0.073*** 15.76 
            Proximity   -0.070 -0.072 3,946   -0.064 -0.069 15,490   -0.006*** 6.85 
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Table 6 
Determinants of supplier-customer contracts 
Probit estimates using Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms are excluded.    The dependent variable in all specifications is 
equal to one if a firm uses Supplier Contracts, and zero otherwise.  Supplier R&D Intensity proxies for RSI (relationship-specific 
investment) and is the weighted-average of all supplier industry's R&D/Total Assets, weighted by the importance of each supplier 
industry to the firm.  Patent Cross-citation Intensity is the percentage of supplier industries which have patent cross-citations with the 
firm's own industry.  Supplier Differentiated Goods proxies for the heterogeneity of a firm's inputs.  I first define a supplier industry as 
either producing differentiated output or not (using the Rauch, 1999 definitions) and then weight each supplier industry's output type by 
the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Relative Herf Index measures relative bargaining power and is the ratio of 
Supplier Herfindahl Index to the firm's own industry Herfindahl Index. Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] is the natural logarithm of the 
contract enforcement ranking for the firm's home state (1 is the worst and 50 is the best).  Price Informativeness is the firm's own stock 
price informativeness measure.  Proximity is the negative of the supplier weighted-average transportation costs from the input-output 
tables.  % of Input Traded proxies for the percentage of a firm's input which is traded on financial markets.  I code supplier industries 
whose output trades on a financial exchange equal to one, and zero otherwise, and then define % of Input Traded as the weighted-
average of all supplier industries, weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Industry-Median Tangibility is the 
industry-year median tangibility ratio (Net PPE/Total Assets).  % Imports is the percentage of a firm's industry's nonclassifiable 
imports.  Herfindahl Index is the firm's 2-digit industry Herfindahl Index.  Book Leverage is long-term debt and current portion of long-
term debt divided by book assets.  R&D Intensity is RD/Total Assets.  Sales Growth is the firm's own industry sales growth.  
Ln[Assets] is the natural logarithm of a firm's book assets. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all models include year 
dummy variables.  t-Statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
         
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         Supplier R&D Intensity 14.80*** 
     
11.09*** 
  
(4.37) 
     
(3.08) 
Patent Cross-citation 
Intensity 
 
0.54*** 
     
   
(2.79) 
     Supplier Differentiated 
Goods 
  
0.40*** 
    
    
(2.92) 
    Relative Herf Index 
   
0.05* 
  
0.05* 
     
(1.76) 
  
(1.80) 
Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] 0.04* 0.06** 0.05* 0.04* 0.05* 0.04 0.05* 
  
(1.65) (2.42) (1.82) (1.72) (1.83) (1.58) (1.79) 
Price Informativeness 
    
-0.22** 
 
-0.21** 
      
(-2.20) 
 
(-2.01) 
Proximity 
      
-1.41*** -0.83* 
       
(-3.37) (-1.81) 
       
Continued… 
        
68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 (continued) 
       % of Input Traded -0.62*** -0.60** -0.45* -0.63*** -0.57** -0.76*** -0.69*** 
  
(-2.67) (-2.47) (-1.95) (-2.75) (-2.38) (-3.21) (-2.79) 
Industry-Median Tangibility -0.32*** -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.47*** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.35*** 
  
(-2.74) (-3.70) (-3.89) (-4.29) (-4.39) (-4.57) (-2.88) 
% Imports 
 
0.53 -3.28 -0.14 -0.83 -1.50 0.28 0.73 
  
(0.21) (-1.21) (-0.05) (-0.33) (-0.56) (0.11) (0.26) 
Herfindahl Index -0.51 -1.80* -1.23 
    
  
(-0.54) (-1.65) (-1.31) 
    Book Leverage -0.14* -0.09 -0.13* -0.15** -0.15 -0.15* -0.14 
  
(-1.92) (-1.08) (-1.72) (-1.99) (-1.64) (-1.96) (-1.47) 
R&D Intensity -0.08 0.03 -0.15 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.15 
  
(-0.54) (0.20) (-1.03) (-0.28) (-0.46) (-0.69) (-0.88) 
Sales Growth 
 
-0.05 -0.12 -0.06 -0.10* -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 
  
(-0.85) (-1.56) (-1.09) (-1.72) (-0.90) (-0.83) (-0.46) 
Ln[Assets] 
 
0.13*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 
  
(13.17) (11.38) (13.18) (13.12) (6.70) (12.57) (6.48) 
Constant 
 
-1.84*** -1.45*** -1.67*** -1.64*** -1.19*** -1.62*** -1.55*** 
  
(-14.06) (-13.06) (-13.89) (-15.02) (-7.49) (-15.81) (-8.55) 
Number of Observations 18,893 12,588 18,893 18,893 16,727 18,590 16,455 
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Table 7 
Robustness: Determinants of supplier-customer contracts - industry-level tests 
OLS estimates by two-digit NAICS industry-year from 2003-2008.  Financial industries are excluded.  The dependent variable in 
all specifications is industry-level Supplier Contracts, or the percentage of firms in the industry which use supplier contracts.  
Supplier R&D Intensity proxies for RSI (relationship-specific investment) and is the weighted-average of all supplier industry's 
R&D/Total Assets, weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Patent Cross-citation Intensity is the 
percentage of supplier industries which have patent cross-citations with the firm's own industry.  Supplier Differentiated Goods 
proxies for the heterogeneity of a firm's inputs.  I first define a supplier industry as either producing differentiated output or not 
(using the Rauch, 1999 definitions) and then weight each supplier industry's output type by the importance of each supplier 
industry to the firm.  Relative Herf Index measures relative bargaining power and is the ratio of Supplier Herfindahl Index to the 
customer industry Herfindahl Index.  Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] is the two-digit NAICS industry average of the natural 
logarithm of the contract enforcement ranking for the firm's home state (1 is the worst and 50 is the best).  Industry-Median 
Tangibility is the industry-year median tangibility ratio (Net PPE/Total Assets).  Proximity is the negative of the supplier 
weighted-average transportation costs from the input-output tables.  % of Input Traded proxies for the percentage of a industry's 
input which is traded on financial markets.  I code supplier industries whose output trades on a financial exchange equal to one, 
and zero otherwise, and then define % of Input Traded as the weighted-average of all supplier industries, weighted by the 
importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  % Imports is the percentage of a firm's industry's nonclassifiable imports.  
Herfindahl Index is the customer industry's two-digit NAICS Herfindahl Index.  Book Leverage is the two-digit NAICS industry 
average of long-term debt and current portion of long-term debt divided by book assets.  R&D Intensity is the two-digit NAICS 
industry average of RD/Total Assets.  Sales Growth is the two-digit NAICS industry sales growth.   Ln[Assets] is the two-digit 
NAICS industry average of the natural logarithm of a firm's book assets.  All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all 
models include year fixed effects.  t-Statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated from robust standard errors clustered 
by industry. 
        
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        Supplier R&D Intensity 1.59*** 
    
1.86*** 
  
(4.29) 
    
(4.25) 
Patent Cross-citation Intensity 
 
0.04 
    
   
(0.68) 
    Supplier Differentiated Goods 
  
0.05*** 
   
    
(3.18) 
   Relative Herf Index 
   
0.01* 
 
0.00 
     
(1.91) 
 
(0.77) 
Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 
  
(1.18) (0.72) (1.25) (1.20) (1.17) (1.49) 
Proximity 
     
-0.02 -0.01 
      
(-0.39) (-0.19) 
% of Input Traded -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
  
(-0.77) (-1.17) (-0.19) (-0.98) (-0.56) (-0.26) 
Industry-Median Tangibility -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
  
(-1.20) (-1.09) (-1.32) (-0.29) (-0.42) (-0.51) 
       
Continued… 
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Table 7 (continued) 
      % Imports 
 
-0.28 -0.50 -0.53 -0.45 -0.55 -0.24 
  
(-0.74) (-0.98) (-1.06) (-0.90) (-1.14) (-0.69) 
Herfindahl Index -0.69*** -0.82*** -0.73*** 
   
  
(-5.38) (-5.71) (-5.01) 
   Book Leverage -0.07 -0.13 -0.10 -0.33*** -0.35*** -0.24* 
  
(-0.70) (-1.15) (-0.93) (-2.65) (-2.73) (-1.83) 
R&D Intensity 0.26*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.35*** 
  
(3.45) (4.08) (4.12) (5.46) (5.23) (3.98) 
Sales Growth 
 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
  
(0.15) (-0.13) (0.08) (-0.37) (-0.49) (-0.11) 
Ln[Assets] 
 
0.04** 0.05** 0.05** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
  
(2.29) (2.36) (2.41) (3.37) (3.57) (3.11) 
Constant 
 
-0.16 -0.09 -0.18 -0.27** -0.28** -0.32** 
  
(-1.40) (-0.76) (-1.39) (-2.08) (-2.01) (-2.43) 
Number of Observations 295 295 295 295 295 295 
R
2 
  0.705 0.670 0.684 0.616 0.607 0.664 
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Table 8 
Determinants of supplier-customer contracts:  integrated firms excluded 
Probit estimates using Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms and integrated firms are excluded.    The dependent variable 
in all specifications is equal to one if a firm uses Supplier Contracts, and zero otherwise.  Supplier R&D Intensity proxies for RSI 
(relationship-specific investment) and is the weighted-average of all supplier industry's R&D/Total Assets, weighted by the importance 
of each supplier industry to the firm.  Patent Cross-citation Intensity is the percentage of supplier industries which have patent cross-
citations with the firm's own industry.  Supplier Differentiated Goods proxies for the heterogeneity of a firm's inputs.  I first define a 
supplier industry as either producing differentiated output or not (using the Rauch, 1999 definitions) and then weight each supplier 
industry's output type by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Relative Herf Index measures relative bargaining power 
and is the ratio of Supplier Herfindahl Index to the firm's own industry Herfindahl Index. Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] is the natural 
logarithm of the contract enforcement ranking for the firm's home state (1 is the worst and 50 is the best).  Price Informativeness is the 
firm's own stock price informativeness measure.  Proximity is the negative of the supplier weighted-average transportation costs from 
the input-output tables.  % of Input Traded proxies for the percentage of a firm's input which is traded on financial markets.  I code 
supplier industries whose output trades on a financial exchange equal to one, and zero otherwise, and then define % of Input Traded as 
the weighted-average of all supplier industries, weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Industry-Median 
Tangibility is the industry-year median tangibility ratio (Net PPE/Total Assets).  % Imports is the percentage of a firm's industry's 
nonclassifiable imports.  Herfindahl Index is the firm's 2-digit industry Herfindahl Index.  Book Leverage is long-term debt and current 
portion of long-term debt divided by book assets.  R&D Intensity is RD/Total Assets.  Sales Growth is the firm's own industry sales 
growth.  Ln[Assets] is the natural logarithm of a firm's book assets. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all models include 
year dummy variables.  t-Statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
         
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         Supplier R&D Intensity 15.67*** 
     
10.82*** 
  
(4.33) 
     
(2.77) 
Patent Cross-citation 
Intensity 
 
0.54*** 
     
   
(2.72) 
     Supplier Differentiated 
Goods 
  
0.43*** 
    
    
(3.00) 
    Relative Herf Index 
   
0.04 
  
0.05 
     
(1.40) 
  
(1.53) 
Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] 0.06** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 
  
(2.14) (2.88) (2.28) (2.19) (2.31) (2.09) (2.30) 
Price Informativeness 
    
-0.15 
 
-0.13 
      
(-1.35) 
 
(-1.11) 
Proximity 
      
-1.78*** -1.19** 
       
(-3.91) (-2.33) 
% of Input Traded -0.37 -0.32 -0.09 -0.30 -0.23 -0.48* -0.47 
  
(-1.36) (-1.13) (-0.33) (-1.13) (-0.81) (-1.71) (-1.59) 
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Table 8 (continued…) 
       Industry-Median Tangibility -0.25** -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.42*** -0.45*** -0.44*** -0.28** 
  
(-2.01) (-2.87) (-3.13) (-3.58) (-3.65) (-3.75) (-2.17) 
% Imports 
 
-1.00 -5.43* -1.70 -2.70 -3.82 -1.21 -1.04 
  
(-0.38) (-1.93) (-0.65) (-1.03) (-1.36) (-0.46) (-0.36) 
Herfindahl Index -0.56 -2.37** -1.36 
    
  
(-0.55) (-1.96) (-1.31) 
    Book Leverage -0.14* -0.09 -0.12 -0.15* -0.15 -0.15* -0.13 
  
(-1.73) (-1.09) (-1.55) (-1.85) (-1.52) (-1.82) (-1.30) 
R&D Intensity -0.01 0.09 -0.09 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 
  
(-0.09) (0.54) (-0.62) (0.20) (-0.04) (-0.28) (-0.50) 
Sales Growth 
 
-0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
  
(-0.24) (-1.06) (-0.41) (-1.07) (-0.31) (-0.15) (0.22) 
Ln[Assets] 
 
0.13*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 
  
(11.93) (10.21) (11.95) (11.98) (6.33) (11.43) (6.10) 
Constant 
 
-1.93*** -1.48*** -1.76*** -1.71*** -1.34*** -1.73*** -1.73*** 
  
(-13.80) (-12.47) (-13.61) (-14.64) (-7.75) (-15.61) (-8.76) 
Number of Observations 16,675 11,119 16,675 16,675 14,658 16,429 14,437 
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Table 9 
Subsample Poisson Estimates - Supplier Contract Length 
Subsample Poisson estimates using Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms are excluded.  A first 
stage probit equivalent to Model 7 in Table 6 is estimated and the inverse mills ratio is calculated.  Contract 
Length is then estimated using Poisson estimations for the subsample after controlling for sample selection 
by including the inverse mills ratio.  The dependent variable in all specifications is equal to the number of 
years into the future a firm has contracted for.  Supplier R&D Intensity proxies for RSI (relationship-specific 
investment) and is the weighted-average of all supplier industry's R&D/Total Assets, weighted by the 
importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Relative Herf Index measures relative bargaining power 
and is the ratio of Supplier Herfindahl Index to the firm's own industry Herfindahl Index.  Price 
Informativeness is the firm's own stock price informativeness measure.  Proximity is the negative of the 
supplier weighted-average transportation costs from the input-output tables.  Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] is 
the natural log of the contract enforcement ranking for the firm's home state (1 is the worst and 50 is the 
best).  Industry-Median Tangibility is the industry-year median tangibility ratio (Net PPE/Total Assets).  % 
Imports is the percentage of a firm's industry's nonclassifiable imports.  Book Leverage is long-term debt and 
current portion of long-term debt divided by book assets.  R&D Intensity is RD/Total Assets.  Sales Growth 
is the firm's own industry sales growth.   Ln[Assets] is the natural logarithm of a firm's book assets.  All 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all models include year dummy variables.  t-Statistics are 
reported in parentheses, are bootstrapped one hundred times, and are calculated from robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
         
  
Supplier Contract 
  
Contract Length 
     
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
  
First Stage 
  
Whole 
 
Vert. Int. 
 
  
Probit 
  
Sample   Excluded   
         Supplier R&D Intensity 11.09*** 
  
23.23 
 
29.35* 
 
  
(3.08) 
  
(1.60) 
 
(1.74) 
 Relative Herf Index 0.05* 
  
0.13* 
 
0.16* 
 
  
(1.80) 
  
(1.79) 
 
(1.81) 
 Price Informativeness -0.21** 
  
-0.57** 
 
-0.70** 
 
  
(-2.01) 
  
(-2.16) 
 
(-2.25) 
 Proximity 
 
-0.83* 
  
-2.24** 
 
-2.44* 
 
  
(-1.81) 
  
(-2.07) 
 
(-1.90) 
 % of Input Traded -0.69*** 
  
-1.72* 
 
-2.08** 
 
  
(-2.79) 
  
(-1.90) 
 
(-1.98) 
 Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] 0.05* 
  
0.14** 
 
0.16** 
 
  
(1.79) 
  
(2.23) 
 
(2.42) 
 Industry-Median Tangibility -0.35*** 
  
-1.23*** 
 
-1.47*** 
 
  
(-2.88) 
  
(-2.72) 
 
(-2.85) 
 % Imports 
 
0.73 
  
0.23 
 
1.77 
 
  
(0.26) 
  
(0.10) 
 
(0.71) 
 Book Leverage -0.14 
  
-0.28 
 
-0.40* 
 
  
(-1.47) 
  
(-1.47) 
 
(-1.76) 
 R&D Intensity -0.15 
  
-0.42 
 
-0.52* 
 
  
(-0.88) 
  
(-1.52) 
 
(-1.71) 
 Sales Growth 
 
-0.03 
  
-0.16*** 
 
-0.17*** 
 
  
(-0.46) 
  
(-3.06) 
 
(-2.77) 
 Ln[Assets] 
 
0.09*** 
  
0.41*** 
 
0.48*** 
 
  
(6.48) 
  
(3.40) 
 
(3.40) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
       Constant 
 
-1.55*** 
  
3.92** 
 
4.80** 
 
  
(-8.55) 
  
(2.28) 
 
(2.44) 
 Inverse Mills Ratio 
   
-7.33** 
 
-9.02** 
 
     
(-2.21) 
 
(-2.36) 
 Number of Observations 16,455     3570   3044   
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Table 10 
Joint determinants of supplier-customer contracts and RSI 
Simultaneous estimates using Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms are excluded.    The 
dependent variables in all specifications are Supplier Contracts or Supplier R&D Intensity.   A firm is 
defined as using Supplier Contracts if a firm reports purchase obligations in their 10-K, and zero 
otherwise. Supplier R&D Intensity is the weighted-average of all supplier industry's R&D/Total Assets, 
weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.   Relative Herf Index measures relative 
bargaining power and is the ratio of Supplier Herfindahl Index to the firm's own industry Herfindahl 
Index. Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] is the natural logarithm of the contract enforcement ranking for the 
firm's home state (1 is the worst and 50 is the best).  Price Informativeness is the firm's own stock price 
informativeness measure.  Proximity is the negative of the supplier weighted-average transportation costs 
from the input-output tables.  % of Input Traded proxies for the percentage of a firm's input which is 
traded on financial markets.  I code supplier industries whose output trades on a financial exchange equal 
to one, and zero otherwise, and then define % of Input Traded as the weighted-average of all supplier 
industries, weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Industry-Median Tangibility 
is the industry-year median tangibility ratio (Net PPE/Total Assets).  % Imports is the percentage of a 
firm's industry's nonclassifiable imports.  Herfindahl Index is the firm's 2-digit industry Herfindahl Index.  
Book Leverage is long-term debt and current portion of long-term debt divided by book assets.  R&D 
Intensity is RD/Total Assets.  Sales Growth is the firm's own industry sales growth.  Ln[Assets] is the 
natural logarithm of a firm's book assets. Supplier Sales Growth is the supplier-industry weighted-
average of the overall industry sales growth.  Industry R&D Intensity is the aggregate industry R&D of 
the customer industry.  Supplier Industry Tobin’s Q is the supplier-industry weighted-average of the 
supplier industry-level market value of assets to book value of assets.  t-Statistics are reported in 
parentheses and are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm.   All variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% and all models include year dummy variables.   
       
  
2SLS Simultaneous   3SLS Simultaneous 
  
Supplier  Supplier  
   Dependent Variable Contracts R&D Intensity   (4) (5) 
       Supplier R&D Intensity 3.27** 
  
7.43*** 
 
  
(2.10) 
  
(9.59) 
 Supplier Contracts 
 
0.01*** 
  
0.01*** 
   
(6.95) 
  
(15.03) 
Relative Herf Index 0.01* 
  
0.06*** 
 
  
(1.67) 
  
(14.63) 
 Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] 0.01* 
  
0.00 
 
  
(1.79) 
  
(1.57) 
 Price Informativeness -0.07** 
  
-0.11*** 
 
  
(-2.07) 
  
(-7.91) 
 Proximity 
 
-0.23 
  
-0.55*** 
 
  
(-1.52) 
  
(-8.48) 
 % of Input Traded -0.19*** 0.00* 
 
-0.29*** 0.00*** 
  
(-3.04) (1.75) 
 
(-7.26) (5.83) 
Industry-Median Tangibility -0.10*** 
  
-0.07*** 
 
  
(-2.88) 
  
(-4.28) 
 % Imports 
 
0.23 
  
-4.44*** 
 
  
(0.30) 
  
(-13.39) 
 Book Leverage -0.03 
  
0.00 
 
  
(-1.46) 
  
(0.35) 
 R&D Intensity -0.03 
  
-0.27*** 
 
  
(-0.78) 
  
(-13.54) 
 Sales Growth 
 
-0.01 
  
0.06*** 
 
  
(-0.45) 
  
(5.13) 
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Table 10 (continued) 
     Ln[Assets] 
 
0.03*** 
  
0.00** 
 
  
(6.28) 
  
(2.40) 
 Supplier Herf Index 
 
-0.08*** 
  
-0.06*** 
   
(-5.44) 
  
(-14.78) 
Supplier Sales Growth 
 
-0.00*** 
  
-0.00*** 
   
(-5.54) 
  
(-8.26) 
Industry R&D Intensity 
 
0.19*** 
  
0.19*** 
   
(27.79) 
  
(65.82) 
Supplier Industry Tobin's Q 
 
0.01*** 
  
0.01*** 
   
(8.08) 
  
(21.92) 
Constant 
 
0.01 0.00 
 
0.06** -0.00 
  
(0.14) (1.43) 
 
(2.28) (-0.59) 
Number of Observations 16,455 16,455   16,455 16,455 
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Table 11  
Determinants of supplier-customer contracts:  cross sectional tests  
Cross-sectional probit estimates by year, using Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms are excluded.    The dependent 
variable in all specifications is equal to one if a firm uses Supplier Contracts, and zero otherwise.  Supplier R&D Intensity proxies for 
RSI (relationship-specific investment) and is the weighted-average of all supplier industry's R&D/Total Assets, weighted by the 
importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Patent Cross-citation Intensity is the percentage of supplier industries which have 
patent cross-citations with the firm's own industry.  Supplier Differentiated Goods proxies for the heterogeneity of a firm's inputs.  I first 
define a supplier industry as either producing differentiated output or not (using the Rauch, 1999 definitions) and then weight each 
supplier industry's output type by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Relative Herf Index measures relative bargaining 
power and is the ratio of Supplier Herfindahl Index to the firm's own industry Herfindahl Index. Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] is the 
natural logarithm of the contract enforcement ranking for the firm's home state (1 is the worst and 50 is the best).  Price Informativeness 
is the firm's own stock price informativeness measure.  Proximity is the negative of the supplier weighted-average transportation costs 
from the input-output tables.  % of Input Traded proxies for the percentage of a firm's input which is traded on financial markets.  I code 
supplier industries whose output trades on a financial exchange equal to one, and zero otherwise, and then define % of Input Traded as 
the weighted-average of all supplier industries, weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Industry-Median 
Tangibility is the industry-year median tangibility ratio (Net PPE/Total Assets).  % Imports is the percentage of a firm's industry's 
nonclassifiable imports.  Herfindahl Index is the firm's 2-digit industry Herfindahl Index.  Book Leverage is long-term debt and current 
portion of long-term debt divided by book assets.  R&D Intensity is RD/Total Assets.  Sales Growth is the firm's own industry sales 
growth.  Ln[Assets] is the natural logarithm of a firm's book assets. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all models include 
year dummy variables.  t-Statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
Year 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Fama-
MacBeth 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
 
Supplier R&D Intensity 13.31** 8.82* 17.46*** 12.02** 13.52*** 5.69* 11.80*** 
  
(2.50) (1.70) (3.11) (2.46) (2.87) (1.72) (7.07) 
Relative Herf Index 0.15*** 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.06** 
  
(3.63) (1.11) (0.01) (1.27) (0.36) (0.90) (2.61) 
Ln[Contracting Legal 
Rank] 
0.08** 0.02 0.06* 0.11*** 0.02 -0.01 0.05* 
  
(2.15) (0.56) (1.88) (3.05) (0.61) (-0.32) (2.53) 
Price Informativeness 0.14 -0.22 -0.27* -0.25* -0.21 -0.42** -0.20** 
  
(0.89) (-1.49) (-1.87) (-1.72) (-1.35) (-2.50) (-2.71) 
Proximity 
 
-1.31* -1.78*** -0.52 -0.24 -0.43 -0.76 -0.84** 
  
(-1.79) (-2.83) (-0.82) (-0.39) (-0.65) (-0.91) (-3.49) 
% of Input Traded -0.74** -0.88** -0.88** -0.79** -0.39 -1.04*** -0.79*** 
  
(-1.98) (-2.49) (-1.99) (-1.96) (-0.89) (-2.84) (-8.79) 
Industry-Median 
Tangibility 
-0.10 -0.38** -0.33* -0.37** -0.42*** -0.24 -0.31*** 
  
(-0.55) (-2.07) (-1.82) (-2.35) (-2.87) (-1.16) (-6.26) 
% Imports 
 
-2.80 -1.03 0.98 0.72 2.99 5.52 1.06 
  
(-0.74) (-0.27) (0.27) (0.19) (0.77) (1.30) (0.89) 
Book Leverage -0.02 -0.33** -0.01 -0.06 -0.23* -0.16 -0.14** 
  
(-0.19) (-2.21) (-0.10) (-0.51) (-1.85) (-1.25) (-2.65) 
R&D Intensity 0.37 -0.05 -0.38 0.06 -0.24 -0.56** -0.13 
  
(1.41) (-0.20) (-1.50) (0.25) (-1.02) (-2.32) (-0.99) 
Sales Growth 
 
-0.42* -0.09 0.01 -0.05 0.11 -0.29 -0.12 
  
(-1.71) (-0.48) (0.04) (-0.44) (1.11) (-1.39) (-1.51) 
        
Continued… 
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Table 11 (continued) 
      
 
Ln[Assets] 
 
0.13*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 
  
(6.17) (5.33) (3.68) (4.82) (4.68) (3.60) (11.39) 
Constant 
 
-2.45*** -1.40*** -1.32*** -1.63*** -1.39*** -1.07*** -1.54 
  
(-8.60) (-5.34) (-5.25) (-6.14) (-5.36) (-3.79) (-7.87) 
Number of Observations 2,914 2,805 2,928 2,778 2,732 2,298 16,455 
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Table 12 
Supplier contracts and firm performance 
Multivariate tests using Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms are excluded.    The dependent variables are operating return on assets (OROA), which is EBITDA/Total 
Assets, industry-adjusted operating return on assets (Ind-Adj OROA) which is OROA minus the industry-year median, and industry-adjusted Tobin's Q (Ind-Adj Q), which is Tobin's Q 
minus its industry-year median.  Industries are defined by two-digit NAICS codes.  Models 1-3 are OLS regressions, Models 4-6 are instrumental variables estimates, and Models 7-9 are 
treatment-effects estimates.  The first-stage for all treatment-effects estimates is the Model 7 in Table 6.  Supplier Contracts is a dummy variable equal to "1" if a firm reported supplier 
contracts in its 10-K filing.  R&D Intensity is RD/Total Assets.    Book Leverage is long-term debt and current portion of long-term debt divided by book assets.  Sales Growth is the 
firm's own industry sales growth.   Ln[Assets] is the natural logarithm of a firm's book assets, and Tobin's Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets.  Capex is 
capital expenditures divided by total assets, and Cash is cash divided by total assets.  All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all models include year fixed-effects.  T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses and are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
OLS 
 
Instrumental Variables 
 
Treatment Effects 
Dependent Variable OROA 
Ind-Adj 
OROA Ind-Adj Q 
 
OROA 
Ind-Adj 
OROA Ind-Adj Q 
 
OROA 
Ind-Adj 
OROA Ind-Adj Q 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
Supplier Contracts 0.0150** 0.0186*** 0.1725*** 
 
0.2337** 0.3331*** 21.0387** 
 
0.2467*** 0.3578*** 2.1744*** 
 
(2.300) (2.817) (3.233) 
 
(2.453) (3.253) (2.095) 
 
(5.296) (7.245) (7.128) 
R&D Intensity -1.1536*** -1.0994*** 3.9058*** 
 
-1.1544*** -1.0979*** 2.9286*** 
 
-1.2481*** -1.1835*** 3.1426*** 
 
(-18.547) (-17.556) (9.778) 
 
(-18.124) (-16.955) (3.800) 
 
(-64.704) (-56.941) (27.768) 
Book Leverage -0.1615*** -0.1625*** 2.3847*** 
 
-0.1518*** -0.1493*** 1.6145** 
 
-0.1317*** -0.1264*** 0.5525*** 
 
(-6.495) (-6.506) (13.131) 
 
(-5.700) (-5.495) (2.230) 
 
(-13.035) (-11.576) (8.759) 
Sales Growth 0.0315*** -0.0021 0.2070*** 
 
0.0320*** -0.0004 0.6074 
 
0.0312*** -0.0012 0.1810*** 
 
(2.805) (-0.186) (2.650) 
 
(2.651) (-0.033) (1.429) 
 
(2.939) (-0.105) (2.619) 
Ln[Assets] 0.0371*** 0.0375*** -0.2972*** 
 
0.0287*** 0.0260*** -0.7586** 
 
0.0206*** 0.0176*** -0.1388*** 
 
(17.409) (17.455) (-14.375) 
 
(7.191) (6.142) (-2.284) 
 
(10.660) (8.527) (-11.034) 
Tobin's Q -0.0188*** -0.0192*** 
  
-0.0178*** -0.0187*** 
  
0.0014 0.0005 
 
 
(-5.043) (-5.074) 
  
(-4.609) (-4.775) 
  
(0.985) (0.332) 
 Capex 0.1786*** 0.0373 3.0656*** 
 
0.2045*** 0.0671 4.0278** 
 
0.2365*** 0.1167*** 3.4212*** 
 
(3.187) (0.662) (7.661) 
 
(3.529) (1.103) (2.191) 
 
(6.348) (3.066) (14.867) 
Cash Holdings -0.1664*** -0.1559*** 2.3290*** 
 
-0.1791*** -0.1699*** 1.9195*** 
 
-0.1801*** -0.1737*** 2.3340*** 
 
(-4.728) (-4.404) (9.785) 
 
(-4.951) (-4.568) (2.596) 
 
(-12.312) (-11.758) (26.000) 
Constant -0.0841*** -0.1684*** 0.7577*** 
 
-0.0863*** -0.1726*** -0.9863 
 
-0.0272*** -0.1194*** -0.3485*** 
 
(-5.082) (-10.165) (5.378) 
 
(-4.890) (-9.376) (-1.615) 
 
(-2.582) (-10.529) (-4.828) 
R
2 
0.481 0.463 0.318 
        Number of Observations 14749 14749 19593 
 
14160 14160 17201 
 
12913 12913 16580 
Instruments Used 
    
Supplier 
R&D 
Supplier 
R&D Supplier Herf 
              Legal Rank Legal Rank Price Infor         
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Table 13 
Supplier contracts and firm performance - RSI and non-RSI environments 
Subsample treatment effect estimates based on different RSI environments.  All tests use Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms are excluded.    The 
dependent variable in the multivariate tests is industry-adjusted Tobin's Q, which is Tobin's Q minus its industry-year median.  Industries are defined by 2-digit 
NAICS codes.  All multivariate estimates are treatment-effects estimates.  The first-stage for all estimates is the Model 7 in Table 6.  Supplier Contracts is a dummy 
variable equal to "1" if a firm reported supplier contracts in its 10-K filing.  R&D Intensity is RD/Total Assets.    Book Leverage is long-term debt and current portion 
of long-term debt divided by book assets.  Sales Growth is the firm's own industry sales growth.   Ln[Assets] is the natural logarithm of a firm's book assets, and 
Tobin's Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets.  Capex is capital expenditures divided by total assets, and Cash is cash divided by total 
assets.  All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all models include year fixed-effects.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated from robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. 
             
  
Dependent variable:  Ind-Adj Qt+1 
  
Supplier Industry R&D 
 
Supplier Differentiated Goods 
 
R&D Intensity 
  
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
             Supplier Contract 0.9282*** 
 
-1.8615*** 
 
0.5686*** 
 
-2.1226*** 
 
1.3894*** 
 
-1.2162*** 
  
(7.074) 
 
(-10.836) 
 
(7.327) 
 
(-10.951) 
 
(8.659) 
 
(-10.439) 
R&D Intensity -0.3138*** 
 
-0.8211*** 
 
-0.4041*** 
 
-0.9567*** 
 
-0.2456*** 
 
-13.9950*** 
  
(-8.049) 
 
(-11.392) 
 
(-17.218) 
 
(-6.750) 
 
(-5.349) 
 
(-3.682) 
Book Leverage -0.0165 
 
-0.0800** 
 
0.0213 
 
-0.0632 
 
-0.0056 
 
-0.1301*** 
  
(-0.766) 
 
(-2.181) 
 
(1.413) 
 
(-1.440) 
 
(-0.197) 
 
(-4.717) 
Sales Growth 0.2377*** 
 
0.0152 
 
0.2437*** 
 
0.0795* 
 
0.1720*** 
 
0.1477*** 
  
(10.511) 
 
(0.347) 
 
(13.841) 
 
(1.718) 
 
(4.922) 
 
(5.372) 
Ln[Assets] -0.0359*** 
 
0.0510*** 
 
-0.0247*** 
 
0.0629*** 
 
-0.0550*** 
 
0.0445*** 
  
(-6.443) 
 
(7.416) 
 
(-7.209) 
 
(7.895) 
 
(-8.207) 
 
(9.154) 
Tobin's Q 
 
0.9914*** 
 
1.0080*** 
 
0.9896*** 
 
1.0062*** 
 
0.9881*** 
 
1.0012*** 
  
(344.431) 
 
(171.969) 
 
(524.175) 
 
(129.009) 
 
(287.685) 
 
(180.807) 
Capex 
 
0.1487* 
 
-0.0983 
 
0.4736*** 
 
-0.2523** 
 
0.2943** 
 
-0.2833*** 
  
(1.698) 
 
(-0.982) 
 
(8.767) 
 
(-1.998) 
 
(2.245) 
 
(-4.047) 
Cash Holdings 0.0018 
 
-0.3059*** 
 
-0.0850*** 
 
-0.2163*** 
 
-0.0470 
 
-0.2172*** 
  
(0.069) 
 
(-6.517) 
 
(-5.199) 
 
(-3.513) 
 
(-1.603) 
 
(-4.817) 
Constant 
 
-1.2878*** 
 
-1.0801*** 
 
-1.2557*** 
 
-1.1285*** 
 
-1.3158*** 
 
-1.1813*** 
  
(-55.592) 
 
(-24.522) 
 
(-74.763) 
 
(-22.593) 
 
(-40.307) 
 
(-38.092) 
Number of 
Observations 8,347   8,233   8,156   8,424   8,545   8,035 
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Table 14 
Supplier contracts and vertical integration 
Probit and Heckman probit estimates using Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms are excluded.  The dependent variable for the probit 
specifications is equal to one if a firm uses supplier contracts and zero if the firm is vertically integrated and does not use contracts.   The dependent 
variable for the first stage Heckman probit estimates is one if the firm either uses contracts or is vertically integrated, and zero if it does neither.  The 
dependent second-stage variable is equal to one if the firm uses supplier contracts and zero if the firm is vertically integrated and does not use 
contracts.  Supplier R&D Intensity proxies for RSI (relationship-specific investment) and is the weighted-average of all supplier industry's R&D/Total 
Assets, weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  Industry-Median Tangibility is the two-digit NAICS industry-year median 
tangibility ratio (Net PPE/Total Assets).  Relative Herf Index measures relative bargaining power and is the ratio of Supplier Herfindahl Index to the 
firm's own industry Herfindahl Index.   Proximity is the negative of the supplier weighted-average transportation costs from the input-output tables.  
Price Informativeness is the firm's own stock price informativeness measure.  Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] is the natural logarithm of the contract 
enforcement ranking for the firm's home state (1 is the worst and 50 is the best).  % of Input Traded proxies for the percentage of a firm's input which 
is traded on financial markets.  I code supplier industries whose output trades on a financial exchange equal to one, and zero otherwise, and then define 
% of Input Traded as the weighted-average of all supplier industries, weighted by the importance of each supplier industry to the firm.  % Import is the 
percentage of a firm's industry's nonclassifiable imports.  Book Leverage is long-term debt and current portion of long-term debt divided by book 
assets.  R&D Intensity is RD/Total Assets.  Ln[Assets] is the natural logarithm of a firm's book assets.  All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and 
all models included year dummy variables.  t-Statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
             
  
Probit 
 
Heckman Probit 
 
Heckman Probit 
      
First 
Stage 
 
Second Stage 
First 
Stage 
 
Second 
Stage 
  
(1)   (2) 
 
(3)   (4) 
 
(5)   (8) 
             Supplier R&D Intensity 39.08*** 
 
41.59*** 
   
36.79*** 
   
38.83*** 
  
(6.40) 
 
(6.51) 
   
(3.31) 
   
(3.76) 
Industry-Median Tangibility -0.43** 
 
-0.41** 
   
-0.44* 
   
-0.41* 
  
(-2.34) 
 
(-2.21) 
   
(-1.95) 
   
(-1.95) 
Relative Herf Index 0.12** 
   
0.00 
 
0.12** 
    
  
(2.43) 
   
(0.03) 
 
(2.04) 
    Supplier Herfindahl Index 
  
6.61* 
     
-0.94 
 
6.31 
    
(1.88) 
     
(-0.52) 
 
(1.53) 
Herfindahl Index 
  
-2.07 
     
-0.37 
 
-2.27 
    
(-1.26) 
     
(-0.41) 
 
(-1.41) 
Proximity 
 
0.86 
 
0.57 
   
0.85 
   
0.57 
  
(1.15) 
 
(0.73) 
   
(0.91) 
   
(0.66) 
Price Informativeness 
    
-0.13 
   
-0.13 
  
      
(-0.64) 
   
(-0.80) 
  % of Input Traded 
    
0.44 
   
0.45 
  
      
(0.94) 
   
(1.18) 
  
           
Continued… 
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Table 14 (continued) 
           Ln[Contracting Legal Rank] -0.05 
 
-0.05 
   
-0.04 
   
-0.04 
  
(-1.07) 
 
(-1.11) 
   
(-0.83) 
   
(-0.87) 
% Imports 
 
11.33** 
 
11.61** 
   
10.40* 
   
10.60* 
  
(2.28) 
 
(2.31) 
   
(1.73) 
   
(1.85) 
Book Leverage -0.25** 
 
-0.26** 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.25 
  
(-2.03) 
 
(-2.10) 
 
(-1.40) 
 
(-1.25) 
 
(-1.36) 
 
(-1.46) 
R&D Intensity 2.12*** 
 
2.24*** 
 
-0.45*** 
 
2.14 
 
-0.47*** 
 
2.22* 
  
(3.25) 
 
(3.26) 
 
(-2.80) 
 
(1.52) 
 
(-2.87) 
 
(1.78) 
Sales 
Growth 
     
-0.12** 
   
-0.13** 
  
      
(-2.16) 
   
(-2.10) 
  Ln[Assets] 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
0.13*** 
 
-0.00 
 
0.13*** 
 
0.00 
  
(-0.26) 
 
(-0.15) 
 
(7.66) 
 
(-0.01) 
 
(8.47) 
 
(0.03) 
Constant 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.09 
 
-1.21*** 
 
-0.23 
 
-1.16*** 
 
-0.35 
  
(-0.00) 
 
(-0.30) 
 
(-5.46) 
 
(-0.09) 
 
(-5.59) 
 
(-0.19) 
Number of Observations 5384   5384   17034   17034   17034   17034 
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Table 15 
Supplier contracts and vertical integration - shocks to human capital RSI 
Probit and OLS estimates using Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms are excluded.    The dependent variables for the Probit 
specifications are Get Supplier Contract (Lose Supplier Contract) which are dummy variables equal to one if the firm gains (loses) supplier 
contracts in year t+1., and Vertically Integrate (Vertically Disintegrate), which are dummy variables equal to one if a firm becomes vertically 
integrated (disintegrated) in year t+1.  The dependent variables for the OLS estimates are Percent Dollar Change, which is the percentage 
increase in next year's dollar obligations from year t to t+1, and Integration Coefficient Change, which is the increase in a firm's vertical 
relatedness coefficient.  Positive (Negative) Industry R&D Shock is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm's industry R&D increased 
(decreased) by 10%, zero otherwise.  All specifications also control for the following variables:   Supplier R&D Intensity proxies for RSI 
(relationship-specific investment) and is the weighted-average of all supplier industry's R&D/Total Assets, weighted by the importance of each 
supplier industry to the firm.  Industry-Median Tangibility is the two-digit NAICS industry-year median tangibility ratio (Net PPE/Total Assets).  
Book Leverage is long-term debt and current portion of long-term debt divided by book assets.  R&D Intensity is RD/Total Assets.  Ln[Assets] 
is the natural logarithm of a firm's book assets.  All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all models included year dummy variables.  t-
Statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
  
Probit 
 
OLS 
  
Get 
Supplier 
Contractt+1 
 
Lose 
Supplier 
Contractt+1 
 
Vertically 
Integratet+1 
 
Vertically 
Disintegratet+1 
 
Dollar 
Changet,t+1 
 
Integration 
Coefficient 
Changet,t+1 
  
(1)   (2) 
 
(3)   (4) 
 
(5)   (6) 
Panel A 
            Positive Industry R&D Shock 0.09* 
 
0.01 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.05 
 
8.67** 
 
-0.08*** 
  
(1.93) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(-0.03) 
 
(-0.74) 
 
(2.00) 
 
(-2.68) 
Supplier R&D Intensity 11.80*** 
 
5.82* 
 
-13.48*** 
 
-7.62* 
 
2,382.09*** 
 
-7.43* 
  
(3.93) 
 
(1.86) 
 
(-3.02) 
 
(-1.75) 
 
(4.98) 
 
(-1.95) 
Industry-Median Tangibility -0.05 
 
-0.23** 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.22 
 
6.93 
 
-0.06 
  
(-0.52) 
 
(-1.98) 
 
(-1.12) 
 
(-1.50) 
 
(0.62) 
 
(-0.50) 
Book Leverage -0.31*** 
 
0.05 
 
0.07 
 
-0.01 
 
-20.91* 
 
0.05 
  
(-3.21) 
 
(0.70) 
 
(0.57) 
 
(-0.08) 
 
(-1.91) 
 
(0.57) 
R&D Intensity 0.03 
 
0.14 
 
-1.70*** 
 
-2.13*** 
 
-19.62 
 
-2.59*** 
  
(0.18) 
 
(1.05) 
 
(-2.61) 
 
(-4.62) 
 
(-0.59) 
 
(-6.70) 
Ln[Assets] 0.03*** 
 
0.03*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
-2.60** 
 
0.17*** 
  
(3.83) 
 
(2.94) 
 
(2.86) 
 
(3.59) 
 
(-2.18) 
 
(14.30) 
Constant 
 
-2.25*** 
 
-2.06*** 
 
-6.32 
 
-6.35 
 
10.15 
 
-1.43*** 
  
(-21.44) 
 
(-20.07) 
 
(0.632) 
 
(0.631) 
 
(0.85) 
 
(-12.85) 
Number of Observations 14,521   14,521   19,744   19,744   1,783   14,926 
            
Continued… 
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Table 15 (continued)                       
  
Get 
Supplier 
Contractt+1 
 
Lose 
Supplier 
Contractt+1 
 
Vertically 
Integratet+1 
 
Vertically 
Disintegratet+1 
 
Dollar 
Changet,t+1 
 
Integration 
Coefficient 
Changet,t+1 
  
(1)   (2) 
 
(3)   (4) 
 
(5)   (6) 
Panel B 
            Negative Industry R&D 
Shock -0.09 
 
-0.07 
 
0.08 
 
0.02 
 
-4.73 
 
0.12*** 
  
(-1.54) 
 
(-1.26) 
 
(1.17) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(-1.39) 
 
(3.77) 
Supplier R&D Intensity 10.18*** 
 
4.98 
 
-12.47*** 
 
-7.11 
 
2,266.13*** 
 
-5.53 
  
(3.37) 
 
(1.55) 
 
(-2.73) 
 
(-1.59) 
 
(4.93) 
 
(-1.45) 
Industry-Median Tangibility 0.01 
 
-0.22* 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.24* 
 
11.71 
 
-0.11 
  
(0.05) 
 
(-1.93) 
 
(-1.20) 
 
(-1.74) 
 
(1.01) 
 
(-0.93) 
Book Leverage -0.31*** 
 
0.05 
 
0.07 
 
-0.01 
 
-21.14* 
 
0.05 
  
(-3.15) 
 
(0.73) 
 
(0.56) 
 
(-0.10) 
 
(-1.92) 
 
(0.51) 
R&D Intensity 0.00 
 
0.14 
 
-1.68*** 
 
-2.11*** 
 
-25.18 
 
-2.53*** 
  
(0.01) 
 
(1.00) 
 
(-2.59) 
 
(-4.60) 
 
(-0.75) 
 
(-6.65) 
Ln[Assets] 0.03*** 
 
0.03*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
-2.64** 
 
0.17*** 
  
(3.79) 
 
(2.96) 
 
(2.88) 
 
(3.62) 
 
(-2.22) 
 
(14.35) 
Constant 
 
-2.16*** 
 
-2.04*** 
 
-6.33 
 
-6.39 
 
0.11 
 
-1.52*** 
  
(-22.55) 
 
(-20.97) 
 
(0.64) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(-13.97) 
Number of Observations 14,521   14,521   19,744   19,744   1,783   14,926 
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Table 16 
Supplier contracts and vertical integration - shocks to physical capital RSI 
Probit and OLS estimates using Compustat firms from 2003-2008.  Financial firms are excluded.    The dependent variables for the Probit 
specifications are Get Supplier Contract (Lose Supplier Contract) which are dummy variables equal to one if the firm gains (loses) supplier 
contracts in year t+1., and Vertically Integrate (Vertically Disintegrate), which are dummy variables equal to one if a firm becomes vertically 
integrated (disintegrated) in year t+1.  The dependent variables for the OLS estimates are Percent Dollar Change, which is the percentage 
increase in next year's dollar obligations from year t to t+1, and Integration Coefficient Change, which is the increase in a firm's vertical 
relatedness coefficient.  Positive (Negative) Industry CAPEX Shock is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm's industry CAPEX increased 
(decreased) by 10%, zero otherwise.  All specifications also control for the following variables:   Supplier R&D Intensity proxies for RSI 
(relationship-specific investment) and is the weighted-average of all supplier industry's R&D/Total Assets, weighted by the importance of 
each supplier industry to the firm.  Industry-Median Tangibility is the two-digit NAICS industry-year median tangibility ratio (Net PPE/Total 
Assets).  Book Leverage is long-term debt and current portion of long-term debt divided by book assets.  R&D Intensity is RD/Total Assets.  
Ln[Assets] is the natural logarithm of a firm's book assets.  All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and all models included year dummy 
variables.  t-Statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
  
Get 
Supplier 
Contractt+1 
 
Lose 
Supplier 
Contractt+1 
 
Vertically 
Integratet+1 
 
Vertically 
Disintegratet+1 
 
Dollar 
Changet,t+1 
 
Integration 
Coefficient 
Changet,t+1 
  
(1)   (2) 
 
(3)   (4) 
 
(5)   (6) 
Panel A 
            Positive Industry CAPEX 
Shock 0.07 
 
0.04 
 
0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-13.36*** 
 
0.00* 
  
(1.23) 
 
(0.64) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(-0.02) 
 
(-4.24) 
 
(1.84) 
Supplier R&D Intensity 11.26*** 
 
5.83* 
 
-13.47*** 
 
-7.30* 
 
2,282.12*** 
 
-7.07* 
  
(3.79) 
 
(1.86) 
 
(-3.02) 
 
(-1.68) 
 
(4.94) 
 
(-1.85) 
Industry-Median Tangibility -0.02 
 
-0.24** 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.24* 
 
13.20 
 
-0.08 
  
(-0.16) 
 
(-2.04) 
 
(-1.16) 
 
(-1.71) 
 
(1.14) 
 
(-0.67) 
Book Leverage -0.31*** 
 
0.05 
 
0.07 
 
-0.01 
 
-21.46* 
 
0.05 
  
(-3.18) 
 
(0.70) 
 
(0.57) 
 
(-0.09) 
 
(-1.95) 
 
(0.58) 
R&D Intensity 0.01 
 
0.14 
 
-1.70*** 
 
-2.11*** 
 
-25.58 
 
-2.56*** 
  
(0.05) 
 
(1.04) 
 
(-2.61) 
 
(-4.60) 
 
(-0.76) 
 
(-6.66) 
Ln[Assets] 0.04*** 
 
0.03*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
-2.68** 
 
0.17*** 
  
(3.85) 
 
(2.96) 
 
(2.86) 
 
(3.62) 
 
(-2.25) 
 
(14.23) 
Constant 
 
-2.20*** 
 
-2.06*** 
 
-6.32 
 
-6.38 
 
0.18 
 
-1.47*** 
  
(-23.00) 
 
(-21.24) 
 
(0.64) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(-13.34) 
Number of Observations 14,521   14,521   19,744   19,744   1,783   14,926 
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Table 16 (continued)                       
  
Get 
Supplier 
Contractt+1 
 
Lose 
Supplier 
Contractt+1 
 
Vertically 
Integratet+1 
 
Vertically 
Disintegratet+1 
 
Dollar 
Changet,t+1 
 
Integration 
Coefficient 
Changet,t+1 
  
(1)   (2) 
 
(3)   (4) 
 
(5)   (6) 
Panel B 
            Negative Industry CAPEX 
Shock -0.09* 
 
0.10* 
 
0.08 
 
-0.04 
 
-4.04 
 
-0.11*** 
  
(-1.84) 
 
(1.95) 
 
(1.14) 
 
(-0.55) 
 
(-1.07) 
 
(-2.74) 
Supplier R&D Intensity 10.66*** 
 
5.97* 
 
-13.31*** 
 
-7.33* 
 
2,314.79*** 
 
-6.84* 
  
(3.59) 
 
(1.90) 
 
(-2.97) 
 
(-1.69) 
 
(4.95) 
 
(-1.79) 
Industry-Median Tangibility -0.04 
 
-0.19* 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.25* 
 
9.72 
 
-0.09 
  
(-0.38) 
 
(-1.67) 
 
(-0.94) 
 
(-1.80) 
 
(0.84) 
 
(-0.76) 
Book Leverage -0.31*** 
 
0.05 
 
0.07 
 
-0.01 
 
-21.02* 
 
0.05 
  
(-3.13) 
 
(0.67) 
 
(0.56) 
 
(-0.10) 
 
(-1.91) 
 
(0.54) 
R&D Intensity 0.02 
 
0.13 
 
-1.72*** 
 
-2.11*** 
 
-22.67 
 
-2.56*** 
  
(0.12) 
 
(0.93) 
 
(-2.67) 
 
(-4.58) 
 
(-0.68) 
 
(-6.68) 
Ln[Assets] 0.03*** 
 
0.03*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
-2.62** 
 
0.17*** 
  
(3.78) 
 
(2.88) 
 
(2.84) 
 
(3.63) 
 
(-2.20) 
 
(14.36) 
Constant 
 
-2.25*** 
 
-2.06*** 
 
-6.33 
 
-6.38 
 
0.67 
 
-1.44*** 
  
(-22.99) 
 
(-20.85) 
 
(0.68) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(-13.41) 
Number of Observations 14,521   14,521   19,744   19,744   1,783   14,926 
